

## AP Comparative Government and Politics Summer Assignment

1. Get a 3-ring binder (1 ½ inch minimum), six divider pages, blue/black ink pens, pencils, and paper. All notes and handouts will stay in this binder for the entire year to create a review book for the AP Exam.
2. Check your access to Canvas. We will use it frequently.
3. Read Chapter 1 in the textbook and take Cornell notes. We will have a reading quiz over this information during the first week of school. See the handout on taking Cornell notes (found under the “About Us – Summer Assignments – AP Comparative Government and Politics” tab at [ca.dmschools.org](http://ca.dmschools.org) if you are not familiar with or need a refresher on Cornell notes. Your notes should go in the first section of your binder.
4. Read the Democratization and Globalization briefing papers found under the “About Us – Summer Assignments – AP Comparative Government and Politics” tab at [ca.dmschools.org](http://ca.dmschools.org). Begin a dialectical journal for the class by responding to these readings. Your journal should have five entries for each briefing paper. Your entries must include at least **three** questions for class discussion on the first day of class.

Think of your dialectical journal as a series of conversations with the texts we read during this course. The process is meant to help you develop a better understanding of these texts. Use your journal to reflect on the readings, make personal connections with the text, make connections between the text and previous learning, share your thoughts on the themes we cover in class, develop questions for class discussions, and gather textual evidence for written assignments. Your journal must be kept in a one-subject spiral notebook. If you need a refresher on how to create a dialectical journal, here are some instructions and a sample:


1. Draw a line down the middle of the paper or fold the paper in half, making two columns.
2. The left column is used for notes - direct quotations or summaries from the reading, **including the page number**.
3. The right column is used for commenting on notes in the left column. Personal reactions to the notes on the left go here.

This example is from the *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass*:

The slaves know little of their ages as horses know of theirs. They seldom come nearer to it than planting time, harvest time, cherry time, spring time, or fall time. Page 19	It seemed to me that slaves were very unaware of their ages. The best reference they could get was through the time of the year. Records were not kept and it reinforces how slaves did not have the same rights as the rest of the population. How unfair that was to them. I couldn't imagine not knowing my exact birth date.
Killing a slave, in Talbot County, Maryland, is not treated as a crime, either by the courts or the community. Page 39	This is another example of how slaves were mistreated and failed to have equal rights. Why would plantation owners and local leaders not follow the law of the land?

If you have any questions, e-mail me at [shawn.voshell@dmschools.org](mailto:shawn.voshell@dmschools.org). Have fun!


# The Cornell Note-taking System





# EXAMPLE

Reagan 1106-1118		Canada Snyder
		8/27/13, Block 6
<p>In this column, write the focus questions from the text. They are listed at the top of the pages and on the 1<sup>st</sup> page of the chapter. Align the notes with the questions, add in key terms too.</p> <p><b>Focus Question: What were the roots of the rise of conservatism in the 1970s?</b></p> <p>See how many “answer” to the focus question aligns to the right?-----&gt;</p> <p><b>Focus Question: How did the Reagan presidency affect Americans at home and abroad?</b></p> <p><b>Reaganomics</b></p> <p><b>War on Unions</b></p> <p><b>Effects?</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Election of Reagan</li> <li>-Carter seen as failure</li> <li>-Let’s make America great again</li> <li>-New coalition of conservatives: Sunbelters—people who moved to south---urban working class, antigovernment crusaders, aggressive foreign policy, libertarians, Christian Right, “traditional values”</li> <li>-conservatism=progress</li> <li>-beacon of liberty and freedom</li> <li>-good speaker</li> <li>-pragmatist and new when to compromise</li>   <li>-cut power of unions</li> <li>-dismantle regulations</li> <li>-Reduce taxes</li> <li>-Tax Reform Act-reduces taxes on richest</li> <li>-cut back on environmental protections and safety rules</li> <li>-supply side=word used by supporters and trickle down=word used by critics</li> <li>-high interest rates, low tax rates to stimulate private investment</li> <li>-all Americans would work harder since they keep more money they earned and then spend it!</li>   <li>-replaced workers on strike with others</li> <li>-hard stance against strikes and unions</li> <li>-recession hit, downsizing, jobs went overseas</li> <li>-stock market rose with a dip in 1987</li> <li>-inflation down</li>   <li>-inequality rose</li> <li>-richest 1% owned 40% of nation’s wealth; didn’t spend it on economy but buying luxury goods</li> </ul>	
<p>Summary: Reaganomics was not economically successful unless you were rich. It increased economic problems for minorities, the middle and upper classes bought more consumer goods, and a recession set in after his presidency. High spending on military, low on social institutions.</p> <p>*You can write your summary over the entire chapter or just at the end of each note page.</p>		



# INTRODUCTION

## What Is Comparative Politics?

**Comparative politics** is the study and comparison of politics across countries. Studying politics in this way helps us examine major questions of political science; for example, why do some countries have democratic regimes whereas others experience authoritarianism? Why and how do regimes change? Why do some countries experience affluence and growth, but others endure poverty and decline? In this volume, we describe and analyze the political systems of 13 countries. We focus on their major geographic and demographic features; the origins and development of their state; and their political regimes, patterns of political conflict and competition, societies, political economies, and relationships with the world. This brief introduction seeks to familiarize students with the very basic vocabulary of comparative politics. The concepts and terms described here will be extremely useful in an examination of any of the 13 country cases contained in this book. Moreover, this vocabulary is an essential tool for making comparisons *among* the cases.

## Comparing States

**States** are organizations that maintain a monopoly of violence over a territory. The term *state* can be confusing because it sometimes refers to a subnational government (for example, any of the 50 states in the United States). Political scientists, however, use *state* to refer to a national organization. In this book, *state* is used in the latter, broader sense. Still, the concept of state is narrower than the notion of country, which encompasses the territory and people living within a state. As illustrated by our collection of cases, states can differ in many ways, including in origin, length of existence, strength, and historical development.<sup>1</sup> Political



scientists also distinguish between the state and the **government**, considering the government to be the leadership or elite that administers the state.

Two of the most obvious differences among states are their size and population (see “In Comparison: Total Land Size” and “In Comparison: Population,” pp. 4 and 5). The 13 countries included in this book vary considerably in both respects. States also vary in their natural endowments, such as arable land, mineral resources, navigable rivers, and access to the sea. Well-endowed states may have advantages over poorly endowed ones, but resource endowments do not necessarily determine a state’s prosperity. Japan, for example, has become one of the world’s dominant economic powers despite having relatively few natural resources. Russia and Iran, in contrast, are rich in natural resources but have struggled economically.

States also differ widely in their origins and historical development.<sup>2</sup> Some countries (for example, China, France, and the United Kingdom) have long

histories of statehood. Other political systems, such as Germany, experienced the creation of a unified state only after long periods of division. Many countries in the developing world became states after they were decolonized. Nigeria, for example, became an independent state relatively recently, in 1960. With the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union two years later, a number of states emerged or reemerged. At the same time, Germany, which had been divided into two states during the Cold War, became a single state in 1990. It is important to point out that in today’s world we continue to witness both the erosion of existing states (for example, Somalia) and the emergence of new ones (for example, the Republic of South Sudan—see “South Sudan, The World’s Newest State,” p. 6).

States differ, too, in their level of organization, effectiveness, and stability. The power of a state depends in part on its **legitimacy**, or the extent to which its authority is regarded as right and proper. Political scientists have long observed




## APPLYING THE VOCABULARY OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS: SOUTH SUDAN, THE WORLD'S NEWEST STATE

The Republic of South Sudan became the world's newest state in July 2011, after a decades-long armed struggle to secede from the Republic of Sudan. A series of civil wars launched by southern Sudanese, who consider themselves ethnically distinct from those in the north, challenged the legitimacy and sovereignty of the government located in the north. The protracted conflict, which killed millions of South Sudanese and destroyed much of the south's economy, was finally halted by a peace agreement that led to a referendum in which over 98 percent of South Sudanese citizens opted for independence.

Along with a new state, South Sudan has adopted a new constitution, which outlines a

new political regime. It calls for a presidential system with a directly elected president, and a new bicameral national legislature. New states face many daunting challenges, and South Sudan is no exception. Decades of war have destroyed much of the economy, and South Sudan is among the very poorest states in the world. Most South Sudanese citizens are subsistence farmers. Only about a quarter of the state's roughly 8 million citizens are literate. South Sudan is also ethnically diverse, with more than 60 different languages spoken. It has a contentious relationship with the more powerful Republic of Sudan.

South Sudan may have one advantage as it builds its new state, though: about 80 percent of the large oil reserves of Sudan are now located in the independent Republic of South Sudan. However, South Sudan is landlocked and depends on the north's infrastructure for transporting oil. The peace accords that led to the referendum on independence call for the two states to split oil revenues. While these revenues may benefit South Sudan, other developing countries with oil wealth have found that overreliance on oil exports can distort economic growth, encourage corruption, and weaken democratic rule, a syndrome that political scientists often call a "resource trap."



Voters in South Sudan were asked to decide between unity with the north or independence.

## MONARCHIES AS A SOURCE OF TRADITIONAL LEGITIMACY IN MODERN DEMOCRACY

By definition, monarchies are not democratic institutions, because monarchs are usually determined according to ascriptive criteria (most often ancestral lineage, seniority, and gender). Among the 13 cases in this volume, however, two vibrant democracies (Japan and the United Kingdom) have retained monarchs as heads of state. How can a democracy justify having a hereditary monarch as head of state? In both Japan and

the United Kingdom, the monarch serves as not only a significant link to the past but also a reminder of the traditions that are cherished in each society. More important, both monarchs are bound by constitutions that limit their power almost entirely to symbolic functions. The monarchy has its critics in both countries, but most citizens support the presence of a head of state who is completely divorced from partisan politics.

that there are different sources of a state's legitimacy. State authority may draw on **traditional legitimacy**, in which the state is obeyed because it has a long tradition of being obeyed. Alternatively, a state may be considered legitimate because of **charismatic legitimacy**, that is, its identification with the magnetic appeal of a leader or movement. Finally, states may gain legitimacy on the basis of **rational-legal legitimacy**, a system of laws and procedures that becomes highly institutionalized. Although most modern states derive their legitimacy from rational-legal sources, both traditional and charismatic legitimacy often continue to play a role. In Japan and the United Kingdom, for example, the monarchy is a source of traditional legitimacy that complements the rational-legal legitimacy of the state. Some postcolonial states in the developing world have had considerable trouble establishing legitimacy. Often colonial powers created states that cut across ethnic boundaries or contain hostile ethnic groups, as in Nigeria and Iran.

States differ in their ability to preserve their sovereignty and carry out the functions of maintaining law and order. **Strong states** can perform the tasks of defending their borders from outside attacks and defending their authority from internal nonstate rivals. **Weak states** have trouble carrying out those basic tasks and often suffer from endemic internal violence, poor infrastructure, and the inability to collect taxes and enforce the rule of law. High levels of corruption are often a

symptom of state weakness. Taken to an extreme, weak states may experience a complete loss of legitimacy and power and may be overwhelmed by anarchy and violence. Political scientists refer to those relatively rare cases as **failed states**.<sup>3</sup>

Finally, states differ in the degree to which they centralize or disperse political power. **Unitary states** concentrate most of their political power in the national capital, allocating little decision-making power to regions or localities. **Federal states** divide power between the central state and regional or local authorities (such as provinces, counties, and cities). Unitary states, such as the United Kingdom and South Africa, may be stronger and more decisive than federal states, but the centralization of power may create local resentment and initiate calls for a **devolution** (handing down) of power to regions and localities. Federal states, such as Brazil, Germany, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, and the United States, often find that their dispersal of power hampers national decision making and accountability.

## Comparing Regimes

**Political regimes** are the norms and rules regarding individual freedoms and collective equality, the locus of power, and the use of that power. It is easiest to think of political regimes as the rules of the game governing the exercise of power. In modern political systems, regimes are most often described in written constitutions. In some countries, however, such as the United Kingdom, the regime consists of a combination of laws and customs that are not incorporated into any one written document. In other countries, such as China and Iran, written constitutions do not accurately describe the extra-constitutional rules that govern the exercise of power.

**Democratic regimes** have rules that emphasize a large role for the public in governance, protect basic rights and freedoms, and attempt to ensure basic transparency of and accountability for government actions. **Authoritarian regimes** limit the role of the public in decision making and often deny citizens' basic rights and restrict their freedoms. In the past quarter-century, the world has witnessed a dramatic rise in the number of democratic regimes.<sup>4</sup> Over half the world's population, however, is still governed by nondemocratic regimes, which one leading research organization defines as either "partly free," sometimes called illiberal (meaning that some personal liberties and democratic rights are limited while others are protected), or "not free," sometimes called authoritarian (meaning that the public has very little individual freedom).<sup>5</sup> Freedom House, a U.S. research organization, regularly measures the amount of freedom in different

### IN COMPARISON

### Freedom House Rankings, 2011

On a scale of 1 to 7, 1 = free; 5 = partly free; 7 = not free.

COUNTRY	RANKING
United Kingdom	1
Germany	1
France	1
United States	1
Japan	1.5
South Africa	2
Brazil	2
India	2.5
Mexico	3
Nigeria	4
Russia	5.5
Iran	6
China	6.5

Source: Freedom House, [www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/fiw/FIW\\_2011\\_Booklet.pdf](http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/fiw/FIW_2011_Booklet.pdf) (accessed 9/8/11).

### A SPECTRUM OF REGIMES: FROM AUTHORITARIANISM TO DEMOCRACY

Our 13 cases exemplify the broad spectrum of regime types. China has the most clearly authoritarian regime of them all, since it tolerates only one political party and does not convene democratic elections. Iran allows elections, but its unelected religious authorities severely circumscribe political parties and

political institutions. Russia today is formally a democracy, but the power of state authorities makes it effectively a semi-authoritarian system, or illiberal democracy. The remaining cases in this volume more easily (if imperfectly and only recently in some instances) satisfy the criteria for being liberal democracies.

political systems, and the “In Comparison” table on p. 8 provides those measures for the 13 cases included in this volume.

## COMPARING DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Most political regimes, whether democratic or not, establish a number of political institutions. Students of comparative politics must learn to identify and distinguish these institutions precisely. The **executive** is the branch of government that carries out the laws and policies of a given state. We can think of the executive branch as performing two separate sets of duties. On the one hand, the **head of state** symbolizes and represents the people, both nationally and internationally, embodying and articulating the goals of the regime. On the other hand, the **head of government** deals with the everyday tasks of running the state, such as formulating and executing policy. The distinction between those roles is most easily seen in, for example, France, Germany, India, Japan, and the United Kingdom, which have separate heads of state and heads of government. Other regimes, such as those of Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, and the United States, assign the two roles of the executive branch to a single individual.

The **legislature** is the branch of government formally charged with making laws. The organization and power of legislatures differ considerably from country to country. In some political regimes, especially authoritarian ones such as China and Iran, the legislature has little power or initiative and serves mainly to rubber-stamp government legislation. In other systems, such as those of Germany and India, the legislature is relatively powerful and autonomous. **Unicameral legislatures** (often found in smaller countries) consist of a single chamber; **bicameral legislatures** consist of two legislative chambers. In the latter systems, one chamber often represents the population at large and is referred to as the **lower house**, and the other chamber (referred to as the **upper house**) reflects the geographical subunits.

The **judiciary** is the branch of a country’s government that is concerned with dispensing justice. The **constitutional court** is the highest judicial body to rule on the constitutionality of laws and other government actions; in most political systems, the constitutional court also formally oversees the entire judicial structure. The power of a regime’s judiciary is determined in part by the nature of its power of **judicial review**, the mechanism by which the court reviews laws and policies and overturns those seen as violations of the constitution. Some regimes give the

judiciary the power of **concrete review**, allowing the high court to rule on constitutional issues only when disputes are brought before it. Other regimes give the judiciary the power of **abstract review**, allowing it to decide questions that do not arise from legal cases, sometimes even allowing it to make judgments on legislation that has not yet been enacted. In France, the Constitutional Council has the power of abstract review, whereas in the United States the Supreme Court has the power of concrete review. The highest courts in the United Kingdom, by contrast, do not have power to overturn legislation passed by the national legislature under any circumstances.

The powers of these political institutions and the relationships among them vary considerably across regimes. The most important variation concerns the relationship between the legislature and the executive. There are three major models of **legislative-executive relations** within democratic regimes: parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential. The **parliamentary system** (seen among our cases in Germany, India, Japan, and the United Kingdom) features an executive

### DON'T JUDGE A LEGISLATIVE CHAMBER BY ITS NICKNAME


Two of the most common and potentially confusing terms in comparative politics referring to modern legislatures are *upper house* and *lower house*. The term *upper house* originally referred to the legislative chamber representing the most powerful classes in society (the aristocratic class), and in pre-democratic England that house wielded the most power. The “lower house” represented the less powerful merchant classes. With the emergence of democracy in many countries, the two houses remained, as did their nicknames, but their powers changed dramatically over time. Today, the lower house is the most representative of the population at large (this is the case in

most of the democracies described in this book), and is therefore vested with more power. In modern democracies, upper houses tend to represent not the aristocracy but geographical subunits such as states, provinces, and regions. Upper houses tend to have fewer powers. However, like all things in comparative politics, there are exceptions. The U.S. upper house (the Senate) and lower house (the House of Representatives) have roughly equal powers. The United Kingdom’s upper house (the House of Lords) until very recently was a bastion of the aristocratic class. But as a rule of thumb, when you hear “lower house,” think “more representative” and “more powerful.”

head of government (often referred to as a prime minister) who is usually elected from within the legislature. The prime minister is usually the leader of the largest political party in the legislature. The prime minister and the **cabinet** (the body of chief ministers or officials in government in charge of such policy areas as defense, agriculture, and so on) are charged with formulating and executing policy. The head of state in such systems has largely ceremonial duties and is usually either an indirectly elected president or a hereditary monarch.


The **presidential system**, used by Brazil, Mexico, and the United States, combines the roles of head of state and head of government in the office of the president. These systems feature a directly elected president who holds most of the government's executive powers. Presidential systems have directly elected legislatures that to varying degrees serve as a check on presidential authority.

Scholars debate the advantages and disadvantages of these legislative-executive models.<sup>6</sup> Parliamentary systems are often praised for reducing conflict between the legislature and the executive (since the executive is approved by the legislature), thus producing more efficient government. In addition, when parliamentary legislatures lack a majority, political parties must compromise to create a government supported by a majority of the legislature. Parliamentary systems are also more flexible than presidential systems because when prime ministers lose the support of the legislature, they can be swiftly removed through a legislative **vote of no confidence**. Coalition governments are often formed as a result of negotiations and compromise between political parties. The appointment of a new prime minister, or the convocation of new elections, can often resolve political deadlocks.




But critics point out that parliamentary systems with a strong majority in the legislature can produce a very dominant, virtually unchecked government. Moreover, in fractious legislatures, it can be difficult to cobble together a stable majority government; and coalitions, when they result, can be unstable.

Presidential systems are often portrayed as more stable than parliamentary systems. There are fixed terms of office for the president and the legislature, which is not the case in most parliamentary systems. Moreover, presidents are directly elected by the public and can be removed only by the legislature and only in cases of criminal misconduct. Nonetheless, presidential systems have been criticized for producing divisive winner-take-all outcomes, lacking the flexibility needed to confront crises, and leading to overly powerful executives in the face of weak and divided legislatures.<sup>7</sup> Also, presidential systems can experience gridlock when the presidency and legislature are controlled by different parties.



In an attempt to avoid the weaknesses of parliamentary and presidential systems, some newer democratic regimes, such as those of France and Russia, have adopted a third model of legislative-executive relations, called the **semi-presidential system**. This system includes both a prime minister approved by the legislature and a directly elected president, with the two sharing executive power. In practice, semi-presidential systems tend to produce strong presidents akin to those in pure presidential systems, but the exact balance between the executives varies from case to case.

Another influential political institution is the **electoral system**, which determines how votes are cast and counted. Most democratic regimes use one of two models. The most commonly employed is **proportional representation (PR)**. Among our 13 cases, Brazil, Russia, and South Africa employ this system. PR relies upon **multimember districts (MMDs)**, in which more than one legislative seat is contested in each electoral district. Voters cast their ballots for a list of party candidates rather than for a single representative, and the percentage of votes a party receives in a district determines how many of that district's seats the party will win. Thus, the percentage of votes each party wins in each district should closely correspond to the percentage of seats allocated to each party. PR systems produce legislatures that often closely reflect the percentage of votes won nationwide by each political party. As a result, they tend to foster multiple political parties, including small ones.



A minority of the world's democracies (mainly France, the United Kingdom, and the former British colonies, such as India, Nigeria and the United States, among the cases in this volume) rely upon **single-member districts (SMDs)**. In these systems, there is only one representative for each constituency, and in each district the candidate with the greatest number of votes (not necessarily a majority) wins the seat. As opposed to PR systems, SMD votes cast for all but the one winning candidate are, in effect, wasted: that is, they do not count toward any representation in the legislature. SMD systems tend to discriminate against

small parties, especially those with a national following rather than a geographically concentrated following.

As with the legislative-executive models, there is vigorous debate about which electoral system is most desirable.<sup>8</sup> PR systems are considered more democratic, since they waste fewer votes and encourage the expression of a wider range of political interests. The PR model increases the number of parties able to win seats in a legislature and allows parties concerned with narrow or minority interests to gain representation. SMD systems are often endorsed because they allow voters in each district to connect directly with their elected representatives instead of their party, making the representatives more accountable to the electorate. Supporters of SMD argue that it is beneficial for eliminating narrowly-based or extremist parties from the legislature. They view SMD systems as more likely to produce stable, centrist legislative majorities.

Some democracies, including Germany, Japan, and Mexico, have combined SMD and PR voting systems in what is known as a **mixed electoral system**. Voters are given two votes: one for a candidate and the other for a party. Candidates in the SMDs are elected on the basis of a plurality; other seats are elected from MMDs and are allocated using PR.

Much of the diversity of comparative politics is the result of different combinations of the political institutions just described. Even among the ten democratic regimes studied in this volume, different combinations of political institutions

## HOW LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE AND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS CAN INTERACT

In some parliamentary systems (for example, in the United Kingdom and, until recently, India), elections regularly produce a majority of seats in the legislature for one party. Such systems tend to use single-member district electoral systems, which usually favor the largest parties at the expense of smaller ones. In other parliamentary systems (for example, in

Germany), elections rarely produce a parliamentary majority for any party. As a result, political parties often form coalition governments by dividing cabinet seats among coalition members. Those parliamentary systems tend to employ proportional representation electoral systems, which more often allow smaller parties to gain representation in the legislature.

result in considerable diversity (see "Combinations of Political Institutions," p. 16). For example, Germany and the United States are federal states, but the United States has a presidential legislative-executive system while Germany uses a parliamentary system. Germany and the United Kingdom both use parliamentary legislative-executive systems, but their electoral systems differ.

## COMPARING NONDEMOCRATIC REGIMES

Many nondemocratic regimes have institutions that on paper appear quite similar to those in democratic regimes. In most authoritarian regimes, however, a study of the legislature, the judiciary, and the electoral system may not reveal much about the exercise of political power.

Nondemocratic regimes differ from one another in a number of important ways. Common forms of nondemocratic regimes include personal dictatorships, monarchies, military regimes, one-party regimes, theocracies, and illiberal regimes. A **personal dictatorship**, such as that of Porfirio Díaz in Mexico (1876–1910), is based on the power of a single strong leader who usually relies on charismatic or traditional authority to maintain power. In a **military regime** (such as Brazil from 1964 to 1985 or Nigeria from 1966 to 1979), the institution of the military dominates politics. A **one-party regime** (such as that in Mexico

### Combinations of Political Institutions

COUNTRY	TYPE OF REGIME	TYPE OF STATE	LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE SYSTEM	ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Brazil	Democratic	Federal	Presidential	PR
China	Authoritarian	Unitary	NA	NA
France	Democratic	Unitary	Semi-presidential	SMD
Germany	Democratic	Federal	Parliamentary	Mixed
India	Democratic	Federal	Parliamentary	SMD
Iran	Authoritarian	Unitary	NA	SMD
Japan	Democratic	Unitary	Parliamentary	Mixed
Mexico	Democratic	Federal	Presidential	Mixed
Nigeria	Democratic	Federal	Presidential	SMD
Russia	Authoritarian	Federal	Semi-presidential	PR
South Africa	Democratic	Unitary	Parliamentary	PR
United Kingdom	Democratic	Unitary	Parliamentary	SMD
United States	Democratic	Federal	Presidential	SMD

from 1917 to 2000) is dominated by a strong political party that relies upon a broad membership as a source of political control. In a **theocracy**, a rare form of government (though one that best characterizes present-day Iran), a leader claims to rule on behalf of God. An **illiberal regime** (as in present-day Russia) retains the basic structures of a democracy but does not protect civil liberties. In the real world, many nondemocratic regimes combine various aspects of these forms. The

apartheid regime in South Africa (1948–1994) had largely democratic political institutions but excluded the vast majority of its black population.

**Communist regimes** are one-party regimes in which a Communist party controls most aspects of a country's political and economic system. Specific Communist regimes (such as China under Mao Zedong or the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin) have sometimes been described as **totalitarian**. Totalitarian regimes feature a strong official ideology that seeks to transform fundamental aspects of the state, society, and economy, using a wide array of organizations and the application of force. As the case of Nazi Germany illustrates, totalitarian regimes need not be Communist.

Nondemocratic regimes use various tools to enforce their political domination. The most obvious mechanisms are state violence and surveillance. The enforcement ranges from systematic and widespread repression (for example, the mass purges in the Soviet Union or contemporary Iran) to sporadic and selective repression of the regime's opponents (as in Brazil during the 1960s). Another important tool of nondemocratic regimes is **co-optation**, whereby members of the public are brought into a beneficial relationship with the state and the government. Co-optation takes many forms, including **corporatism**, in which citizen participation is channeled into state-sanctioned groups; **clientelism**, in which the state provides benefits to groups of its political supporters; and **rent seeking**, in which the government allows its supporters to occupy positions of power in order to monopolize state benefits. The nondemocratic regime that dominated Mexico for much of the twentieth century skillfully employed all these forms of co-optation to garner public support for the governing party, minimizing its need to rely upon coercion. Finally, the mechanism of control that is most often employed in totalitarian regimes is the **personality cult**, or the state-sponsored exaltation of a leader. The personality cult of Stalin in the Soviet Union and that of Mao in China are prime examples, as is the cult of personality that developed around Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

### Comparing Political Conflict and Competition

Political scientists can compare and contrast patterns of political conflict and competition in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. In democratic regimes, for example, it is common to compare the nature of elections and

other forms of competition among political parties (often referred to as the **party system**).

On the most basic level, political scientists can compare the nature of **suffrage**, or the right to vote. In democratic regimes and even in many nondemocratic ones, such as China and Iran, that right is often guaranteed to most adult citizens.<sup>9</sup> Another important feature of elections is the degree to which citizens actually participate by voting and by engaging in campaign activities (see “In Comparison: Average Voter Turnout, 1945–98,” below). Party systems also can be compared on the basis of the number of parties, the size of their membership, their organizational strength, their ideological orientation, and their electoral strategies.

A comparative analysis of political conflict and competition cannot focus solely on elections, though. In most political systems, much political conflict and competition takes place in **civil society**, which comprises the organizations

outside the state that help people define and advance their own interests. In addition to political parties, the organizations that make up a country’s civil society often include a host of groups as diverse as gun clubs and labor unions. Many scholars believe that these autonomous societal groups are vital to the health of democratic regimes.<sup>10</sup>

## Comparing Societies

The state and the regime exist in the context of their society, and societies differ from one another in ways that can strongly influence politics. For example, ethnic divisions exist within many states. **Ethnicity** refers to the specific attributes that make one group of people culturally different from others: for example, customs, language, religion, geographical region, and history. Some states, such as China, Germany, Japan, and Russia, are relatively homogeneous: one ethnic group makes up a large portion of the society. At the other extreme, countries such as India, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, and South Africa have a great deal of ethnic diversity. Ethnic diversity can often be a source of political conflict, and even in relatively homogeneous societies the presence of ethnic minorities can pose political challenges (see “In Comparison: Ethnic and Religious Diversity,” p. 20).<sup>11</sup>

### IN COMPARISON

#### Average Voter Turnout, 1945–98

COUNTRY (NUMBER OF ELECTIONS)	ELIGIBLE VOTERS VOTING (%)
South Africa (1)	85.5
Germany (13)	80.6
United Kingdom (15)	74.9
Japan (21)	69.0
Iran (2)	67.6
France (15)	67.3
India (12)	60.7
Russia (2)	55.0
United States (26)	48.3
Mexico (18)	48.1
Brazil (13)	47.9
Nigeria (3)	47.6
China	N/A

Source: “Turnout in the World: Country by Country Performance,” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, [www.idea.int/vt/survey/voter\\_turnout\\_pop2.cfm](http://www.idea.int/vt/survey/voter_turnout_pop2.cfm) (accessed 9/8/11).

### ETHNICITY AS THE BASIS FOR AUTONOMY OR SECESSION MOVEMENTS

In many of our cases (including China, India, Iran, Nigeria, Russia, and the United Kingdom), regions with a distinct ethnic identity have often sought either greater autonomy from the central state or outright independence. Sometimes states are able to weaken secession movements by granting greater political autonomy to regional ethnic groups.

In other cases, such as in Scotland and the United Kingdom, increased autonomy has only fueled a desire for independence. Some regimes, including authoritarian ones such as China and Iran and illiberal democracies such as Russia, have viewed regionally-based ethnic groups as a threat and have harshly repressed them.


Societies also differ in terms of their political cultures. **Political culture** can be defined as the patterns of basic norms relating to politics. Political scientists have learned a great deal about how political cultures differ in a variety of areas, including citizens' trust in government, respect for political authority, knowledge about politics, and assessment of their political efficacy (the ability to influence political outcomes).<sup>12</sup>

Political scientists also consider **national identity**, or the extent to which citizens of a country are bound together by a common set of political aspirations (most

often self-government and sovereignty). Countries with a long history as consolidated states often have higher levels of national identity than do states with a shorter history. Political scientists use the term **nationalism** to refer to pride in one's people and the belief that they share a common political identity. Individuals who believe they have a common political destiny, or **nationalists**, often seek the creation of a new state for individuals sharing that identity. Scottish nationalists, who seek an independent Scottish state, or Tibetan nationalists, who want Tibet to be independent from China, are excellent examples of nationalism in contemporary politics.

One interesting difference among societies is in the importance they place on religion. In most societies, religiosity has declined with economic prosperity and with the growth of secular (nonreligious) values. France, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom are relatively secular societies in which most people do not view religion as very important; the United States continues to be an interesting exception in this regard. In Nigeria and Iran, religion is viewed as important by nearly all citizens.

Individuals and groups within a society can also be distinguished according to their political attitudes and ideologies. **Political attitudes** describe views





Catalan nationalists in Spain seek independence from the Spanish state. The banner states "We are a Nation. We Decide."

IN COMPARISON		Ethnic and Religious Diversity		
COUNTRY	LARGEST ETHNIC GROUP (%)	SECOND-LARGEST ETHNIC GROUP (%)	LARGEST RELIGIOUS GROUP (%)	SECOND-LARGEST RELIGIOUS GROUP (%)
Brazil	55.0	38.0	80.0	20.0
China	92.0	8.0	94-96.0	3-4.0
France*	N/A	N/A	83-88.0	5-10.0
Germany	91.5	2.4	34 <sup>†</sup>	34 <sup>†</sup>
India	72.0	25.5	81.0	12.0
Iran	51.0	24.0	89.0	9.0
Japan	99.0	1.0	84.0	16.0 <sup>‡</sup>
Mexico	60.0	30.0	89.0	6.0
Nigeria	29.0	21.0	50.0	40.0
Russia	81.5	3.8	54.0	19.0
South Africa	75.0	13.0	78.7	19.8
United Kingdom	81.5	9.6	71.6	2.7
United States	67.0 <sup>**</sup>	14.0 <sup>††</sup>	52.0	24.0

\*The French census does not collect data on ethnicity.  
<sup>†</sup>Protestants and Catholics have the same percentage of members in Germany.  
<sup>‡</sup>All other religious groups combined.  
<sup>\*\*</sup>Based on the U.S. Census Bureau's 2003 estimate that about 14 percent of citizens are Hispanic.  
<sup>††</sup>All other ethnic groups combined.

regarding the status quo in a society, specifically, the desired pace and methods of political change. **Radical attitudes** support rapid, extensive, and often revolutionary change. **Liberal attitudes** promote evolutionary change within the system. **Conservative attitudes** support the status quo and view change as risky. **Reactionary attitudes** promote rapid change to restore political, social, and economic institutions that once existed. Since political attitudes are views of the status quo, radicals, liberals, conservatives, and reactionaries differ according to their setting. A reactionary in the United Kingdom, for example, might support the creation of an absolute monarchy, a reactionary in Germany might desire a return to Nazism, and a reactionary in China might call for a return to Maoist communism.

Whereas political attitudes are particular and context-specific, **political ideologies** are universal sets of political values regarding the fundamental goals of politics.<sup>13</sup> A political ideology prescribes an ideal balance between freedom and equality. The ideology of **liberalism** (as opposed to a liberal political attitude) places a high priority on individual political and economic freedoms, favoring them over any attempts to create economic equality. Private **property**, capitalism, and protections for the individual against the state are central to liberal ideology. In the United States such views tend to be called “libertarian.” **Communism**, in contrast, emphasizes economic equality rather than individual political and economic freedoms. Collective property (state ownership) and a dominant state are cornerstones of communism. **Social democracy** (often referred to as democratic socialism) is in some ways a hybrid of liberalism and communism in that it places considerable value on equality but attempts to protect some individual freedoms. Social democrats advocate a mixed welfare state in which an active state exists alongside a largely private economy.<sup>14</sup> **Fascism**, like communism, is hostile to the idea of individual freedom but rejects the notion of equality. **Anarchism**, like



communism, is based on the belief that private property and capitalism create inequality, but like liberalism, it places a high value on individual political freedom.

In recent decades **fundamentalism** has emerged as an important ideology. It differs from the five ideologies just mentioned in that it seeks to unite religion with the state, and to make faith the sovereign authority. Fundamentalists thus view some form of theocracy (or rule by clerics) as the way to implement their ideology. Among the cases studied in this text, Iran’s political regime is most inspired by fundamentalist ideology.

The strength of each ideology differs across political systems. For example, opinion research demonstrates that citizens in the United States and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom have an unusually strong commitment to liberal ideology; large numbers of them support individualism and manifest a notable distrust of state activism. French and Japanese citizens tend to be less individualistic and are more supportive of an active role for the state in the economy. In China, the rise of capitalist economics has eroded popular support for Communist ideology.


## Comparing Political Economies

The study of how politics and economics are related is commonly known as **political economy**; this relationship differs considerably in different political systems.<sup>15</sup> All modern states, however, intervene to some extent in the day-to-day affairs of their economies, and in doing so they depend on a variety of economic institutions. Perhaps the most important of these is the **market**, or the interaction between the forces of supply and demand that allocate goods and resources. Markets, in turn, depend on the institution of property, a term that means the ownership of goods and services. In their attempt to ensure the distribution of goods and resources, states differ in their interaction with the market and their desire and ability to protect private property.

A major political issue in most societies, and a major point of contention among political ideologies, is the appropriate role of the market and the state in the allocation of goods and services. Some goods—for example, clean air and water—are essential to all of society but not easily provided by the market; these are often referred to as **public goods**. Other goods, such as the production of food and automobiles, are more feasibly provided by private producers using the market. In between those extremes is a large gray area. States differ in the degree to which they define a wide array of goods and services as public goods. As a result, government **social expenditures** (state provision of public benefits, such as education, health care, and transportation) vary widely among countries.

In the political economic systems of countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, where liberal ideology is dominant, the state plays a significant but relatively small role. In France, Germany, and Japan, however, the state has played a much larger role in the economy through state ownership (especially in France) and state planning (especially in Japan). Authoritarian regimes have typically had a heavy hand in economic matters, as has certainly been the case in China and Iran. Whereas China's Communist regime has gradually allowed growth in the private sector, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 led to an increase in that state's involvement in the economy.

Economies also differ markedly in their size, affluence, rates of growth, and levels of equality. The most commonly used tool for comparing the size of economies is the **gross domestic product (GDP)**, the total market value of goods and services produced in a country in one year. GDP is often measured in U.S. dollars at **purchasing power parity (PPP)**, a mechanism that attempts to





estimate the real buying power of income in each country using prices in the United States as a benchmark (see “In Comparison: Total GDP at Purchasing Power Parity,” above). In terms of the overall size of the 13 economies considered in this volume, China, India, Japan, and the United States, dwarf the other cases. It is sometimes more useful, however, to look at **GDP per capita**, which divides the GDP by total population (see “In Comparison: Total Per Capita GDP at Purchasing Power Parity,” p. 26). Because GDP is rarely distributed evenly among the population, the **Gini index** is the most commonly used measure of economic inequality, in which perfect equality is scored as 0, and perfect inequality is scored as 100. Endemic inequality has long been a characteristic of developing countries, such as Brazil, India, Mexico, and South Africa, though some developing countries (like Brazil and India) have made progress in reducing inequality in recent years. In wealthy countries such as the United States, the

economic boom of the 1980s and 1990s led to a growing gap between the rich and the poor and a surprisingly large increase in the percentage of the population in poverty.

It is also important to compare the GDP's rate of growth, often expressed as an average of GDP growth over a number of years. Nine of the 13 countries considered in this volume enjoyed economic growth between 1975 and 2005, with China and India growing fastest (see "In Comparison: GDP Growth Rate, 1975–2005," p. 27).

The size and wealth of an economy, and even the distribution of wealth, are not necessarily correlated with the affluence or poverty of its citizens. The United Nations produces a Human Development Index (HDI) that considers a variety of indicators of affluence, including health and education (see "In Comparison:




Human Development Index Scores, 2011," p. 28). When considering GDP per capita and the HDI, one sees that the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, and France are clearly the most affluent of the countries discussed in this volume. However, since 1980 the developing nations have made the most dramatic improvements in their HDI, with China, Iran, and India leading the way. In the last decade India and China have seen impressive growth in their HDI (see "In Comparison: Average Annual HDI Growth Rates, 1980–2011, and 2000–2011," p. 29).

Governments often struggle with myriad challenges within their economic systems. One concern is the danger of **inflation**, a situation characterized by sustained rising prices. Extremely high levels of inflation (**hyperinflation**) can endanger economic growth and impoverish citizens who live on a fixed income. Governments also fear the consequences of high levels of unemployment, which can place a large burden on public expenditures and reduce the tax base.

IN COMPARISON

Human Development Index Scores, 2011



Source: United Nations Development Program, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/profiles/> (accessed 9/8/11).  
 Note: The Human Development Index is a composite measure of developmental indicators (100 = most developed).

IN COMPARISON

Average Annual HDI Growth Rates, 1980-2011, and 2000-2011

COUNTRY	AVERAGE ANNUAL HDI GROWTH, 1980-2011	AVERAGE ANNUAL HDI GROWTH, 2000-2011
Japan	.47	.33
United States	.27	.13
Germany	.69	.43
France	.66	.40
United Kingdom	.48	.33
Mexico	.85	.64
Brazil	.87	.69
Iran	1.57	.97
Nigeria	NA	NA
South Africa	.30	.05
India	1.51	1.56
China	1.73	1.43
Russia	NA	.81

Source: United Nations Development Program, [http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR\\_2011\\_EN\\_Table2.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2011_EN_Table2.pdf) (accessed 12/12/11).

## The Global Context

A country's politics is not determined solely by domestic factors. Increasingly, international forces shape politics in the context of a rapidly expanding and intensifying set of links among states, societies, and economies. This phenomenon, known as **globalization**, has created new opportunities while posing important challenges to states. Crossborder interactions have long existed, but the trend toward globalization has created a far more extensive and intensive web of relationships among many people across vast distances. People are increasingly interacting regularly and directly through sophisticated international networks involving travel, communication, business, and education.

It is too early to predict the consequences of globalization for governments and citizens of states. Some observers have argued that globalization may eclipse the state, resulting in global political institutions, whereas others contend that states will continue to play an important, albeit changed, role.<sup>16</sup> Governments are increasingly restricted by the international system, both because of international trade agreements (such as those promoted by the World Trade Organization) and because of the need to remain competitive in the international marketplace.

As a result of globalization, a host of international organizations regularly affects domestic politics, economics, and society. **Multinational corporations (MNCs)**, firms that produce, distribute, and market goods or services in more than one country, are increasingly powerful. They are an important source of

**foreign direct investment**, or the purchase of assets in one country by a foreign firm. An array of **nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)**—Amnesty International and the International Red Cross, for example—is increasingly visible. Also active are **intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)**, which are groups created by states to serve particular policy ends. Some important examples of IGOs are the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the European Union, the Group of 8 (G8), and the Organization of American States.

A final dimension of globalization, and another example of the growing interconnectedness of states, is the increasing movement of people both within and across borders. Relatively homogeneous societies such as France and the United Kingdom have struggled in recent decades to integrate their growing immigrant populations, while Japan faces a demographic crisis because of its failure to encourage immigration (an issue explored in the Japan case in this book). The United States has become dependent on immigrant labor from Mexico and elsewhere. China's opening to the world economy has drawn millions of rural citizens to its booming coastal cities. More than ever, states find that the environment of globalization limits the policy options open to their governments.

Globalization presents numerous challenges, but the cases in this volume also suggest that globalization has delivered enormous benefits. After World War II, Germany's integration into the European Union led to peace in a region often characterized by war, and it contributed to the rapid economic growth of Germany and France. Since the United Kingdom joined the European Union, its economy has boomed. Japan's spectacular postwar recovery was based on global trade. In China and India, integration into the world economy has lifted millions out of poverty.

## Conclusion

This introduction briefly summarized some key concepts and terms used by political scientists to compare political systems. The inquisitive student of comparative politics will find fascinating similarities in the 13 cases that follow. The commonalities across cases give credence to the utility of the comparative enterprise and justify the analytic comparisons offered. But these countries are also diverse and always changing, reminding us of the daunting challenges facing comparative political study.

## NOTES

1. For an excellent collection of essays on the state, see Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
2. On the origins of the state and forms of authority preceding the state, see Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).
3. Robert I. Rotberg, "Failed States in a World of Terror," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 127–40.
4. Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
5. Freedom House issues a yearly report card rating political regimes. See [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org), and specifically [www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=1120](http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=1120) (accessed 9/13/2011).
6. See, for example, Alfred Stepan with Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism," *World Politics* 46, no. 1 (January 1993): 1–22.
7. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failures of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
8. For an interesting contribution to the debate, see Benjamin Reilly, "Electoral Systems for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 156–70.
9. Nondemocratic regimes such as the former Soviet Union or contemporary Iran often feature elections that impose serious limits on the political opposition. In the Soviet Union, only the Communist Party could run candidates. In Iran, the government has often excluded opposition candidates.
10. See, for example, Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001).
11. For a good overview, see Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
12. Among the many works on public opinion and political participation, see Russell Dalton, *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2005).
13. For a good overview of political ideologies, see Leon Baradat, *Political Ideologies*, 11th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2011).
14. Confusingly for U.S. and Canadian students, in those countries such views are usually called "liberal." Thus, the U.S. Democratic Party and the Liberal Party in Canada are best thought of as social-democratic parties. In Europe, "liberal" parties are free-market and small-government parties.
15. For a classic treatment of political economy, see Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets: The World's Political Economic Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1977). The field of international political economics, which studies the relationships between politics and economics on the international level and in political science, is a subfield of international relations.
16. For an example of the former, see Martin van Creveld, "The Fate of the State," *Parameters* (Spring 1996): 4–18. For an example of the latter, see Saskia Sassen, "The State and Globalization," in Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas Biersteker, eds., *The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 94–106.

## KEY TERMS

**abstract review** The power of judicial review that allows courts to decide on questions that do not arise from actual legal cases; sometimes occurs even before legislation becomes law

**anarchism** An ideology believing that private property and capitalism lead to inequality, but, like liberals, anarchists place high value on individual political freedom

**authoritarian regimes** Regimes that limit the role of the public in decision making and often deny citizens basic rights and restrict their freedoms

**bicameral legislatures** Legislatures with two chambers

**cabinet** The chief government ministers or officials in government, in charge of such policy areas as defense and agriculture

**charismatic legitimacy** Legitimacy based on a state's identification with an important individual

**civil society** The collection of organizations outside of the state that help people define and advance their own interests

**clientelism** The mechanism whereby the state provides benefits to groups of its political supporters

**communism** An ideology that places the emphasis on creating economic equality instead of on individual political and economic freedoms

**Communist regimes** One-party authoritarian regimes in which a Communist party controls most aspects of a country's political and economic system

**comparative politics** The study and comparison of politics across countries

**concrete review** The power of judicial review that allows the high court to rule on constitutional issues only on the basis of disputes brought before it

**conservative attitudes** Attitudes that support the status quo and view change as risky

**constitutional court** The highest judicial body that rules on the constitutionality of laws and other government actions and, in most political systems, formally oversees the entire judicial structure

**co-optation** The mechanism by which members of the public are brought into a beneficial relationship with the state and government

**corporatism** The mechanism by which citizens are forced to participate in state-sanctioned groups

**democratic regimes** Regimes with rules that emphasize a large role for the public in governance and that protect basic rights and freedoms

**devolution** The process by which central states hand power down to lower levels of government

**electoral system** The system that determines how votes are cast and counted

**ethnicity** The specific attributes and society groups that make one group of people culturally different from others

**executive** The branch of government that carries out the laws and policies of a given state

**failed states** States that experience a complete loss of legitimacy and power, and are overwhelmed by anarchy and violence

**fascism** An ideology that is hostile to the idea of individual freedom and rejects the notion of equality

**federal states** States whose power is divided between the central state and regional or local authorities (such as states, provinces, counties, and cities)

**foreign direct investment** The purchase of assets in one country by a foreign firm

**fundamentalism** An ideology that seeks to unite religion with the state so as to make religion the sovereign authority

**GDP per capita** A measure of affluence that divides gross domestic product by total population

**Gini index** The most commonly used measure of economic inequality

**globalization** The process of expanding and intensifying linkages among states, societies, and economies

**government** The leadership or elite that operates the state

**gross domestic product (GDP)** The total market value of goods and services produced within a country over a period of one year

**head of government** The individual who deals with the everyday tasks of running the state, such as formulating and executing policy

**head of state** The individual who symbolizes and represents the people, both nationally and internationally, embodying and articulating the goals of the regime

**hyperinflation** Extremely high levels of inflation

**illiberal regime** An authoritarian regime that retains the basic structures of democracy but does not protect basic civil liberties

**inflation** A situation of sustained rising prices

**intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)** Groups created by states to serve particular policy ends

**judicial review** The mechanism by which a court can review laws and policies and overturn those that are seen as violations of the state's constitution

judiciary The branch of a country's central administration that is concerned with dispensing justice

legislative-executive relations The relationship between legislatures and the executive

legislature The branch of government that is formally charged with making laws

legitimacy State authority that is regarded as right and proper

liberal attitudes Attitudes that promote evolutionary change within a system

liberalism An ideology that places a high priority on individual political and economic freedoms, favoring them over any attempts to create economic equality

lower house The legislative chamber that usually represents the population at large

market The interaction between the forces of supply and demand that allocates goods and resources

military regime An authoritarian regime in which the institution of the military dominates politics

mixed electoral system An electoral system that combines single-member districts and proportional representation

multimember districts (MMDs) Districts in which more than one legislative seat is contested

multinational corporations (MNCs) Firms that produce, distribute, and market in more than one country

nationalism Pride in one's people and the belief that they share a common political identity

nationalists Individuals who believe they have a common political destiny

national identity The common set of political aspirations that bind citizens of a country together

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) National or international groups, independent of any state, that pursue policy objectives and foster public participation

one-party regime An authoritarian regime that is dominated by a strong political party able to create a broad membership as a source of political control

parliamentary system A legislative-executive system that features a head of government (often referred to as a prime minister) elected from within the legislature

party systems Systems characterized by competition among political parties

personal dictatorship An authoritarian regime that is based on the power of a single strong leader who usually relies on charismatic or traditional authority to maintain power

personality cult State-sponsored exaltation of an authoritarian leader

political attitudes Views regarding the status quo in any society, specifically the desired pace and methods of political change

political culture Societal pattern of basic norms about politics

political economy The study of how politics and economics are related

political ideologies Sets of political values regarding the fundamental goals of politics

political regimes The norms and rules regarding individual freedom and collective equality, the locus of power, and the use of that power

presidential system A legislative-executive system that features a directly elected president with most executive powers

property Ownership of goods and services

proportional representation (PR) An electoral system where the percentage of votes a party receives in a district determines how many of that district's seats the party will gain

public goods Goods and services that benefit all society and are not easily provided by the market

purchasing power parity (PPP) A mechanism that attempts to estimate the real buying power of income in each country, using U.S. prices as a benchmark

radical attitudes Attitudes that support rapid, extensive, and often revolutionary change

rational-legal legitimacy Legitimacy based on a system of laws and procedures that become highly institutionalized

reactionary attitudes Attitudes that promote rapid change to restore political, social, and economic institutions that once existed

rent seeking A process whereby the government allows its supporters to occupy positions of power in order to monopolize state benefits

semi-presidential system A legislative-executive system that features a prime minister approved by the legislature *and* a directly elected president

single-member districts (SMDs) Districts in which only one representative for each constituency and the candidate with the largest number of votes—and not necessarily a majority—wins the seat

**social democracy** An ideology that places considerable value on equality, but also attempts to protect some individual freedoms

**social expenditures** State provision of public benefits, such as education, health care, and transportation

**states** Organizations that maintain a monopoly of violence over a territory

**strong states** States that perform the basic tasks of defending their borders from outside attacks and defending their authority from internal nonstate rivals

**suffrage** The right to vote

**theocracy** An authoritarian regime that has leaders who claim to rule on behalf of God

**totalitarian** Characterized by a strong, official ideology that seeks to transform fundamental aspects of the state, society, and the economy using a wide array of organizations and the application of force

**traditional legitimacy** Legitimacy in which the state is obeyed because it has a long tradition of being obeyed

**unicameral legislatures** Legislatures with a single chamber

**unitary states** States that concentrate most political power in the national capital, allocating very little decision-making power to regions or localities

**upper house** The legislative house that often represents geographic subunits

**vote of no confidence** Legislative check on government whereby a government deems a measure to be of high importance, and if that measure fails to pass the legislature, either the government must resign in favor of another leader or new parliamentary elections must be called

**weak states** States that have trouble carrying out the basic tasks of defending themselves against external and internal rivals, and often suffer from endemic violence, poor infrastructure, weak rule of law, and an inability to collect taxes

## WEB LINKS

---

CIA World Factbook ([www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook))

*Comparative Politics* (<http://web.gc.cuny.edu/jcp>)

Freedom House ([www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org))

Inter-Parliamentary Union ([www.ipu.org/english/home.htm](http://www.ipu.org/english/home.htm))

*Journal of Democracy* ([www.journalofdemocracy.org](http://www.journalofdemocracy.org))

Political Science Resource Pages ([www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area.htm](http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area.htm))

World Bank ([www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org))

The WWW Virtual Library: International Affairs Resources ([www2.etoyn.edu/vl](http://www2.etoyn.edu/vl))



Visit StudySpace for quizzes and other review material.

[www.norton.com/studyspace](http://www.norton.com/studyspace)

- Vocabulary Flashcards of All Key Terms
- Country Review Quizzes
- Interactive Map Tours





**AP<sup>®</sup> Comparative  
Government  
and Politics**  
Democratization  
Briefing Paper

G. Bingham Powell, Jr.  
University of Rochester  
Rochester, New York

Eleanor N. Powell  
Harvard University  
Cambridge, Massachusetts

connect to college success™  
[www.collegeboard.com](http://www.collegeboard.com)

## The College Board: Connecting Students to College Success

The College Board is a not-for-profit membership association whose mission is to connect students to college success and opportunity. Founded in 1900, the association is composed of more than 4,700 schools, colleges, universities, and other educational organizations. Each year, the College Board serves over three and a half million students and their parents, 23,000 high schools, and 3,500 colleges through major programs and services in college admissions, guidance, assessment, financial aid, enrollment, and teaching and learning. Among its best-known programs are the SAT<sup>®</sup>, the PSAT/NMSQT<sup>®</sup>, and the Advanced Placement Program<sup>®</sup> (AP<sup>®</sup>). The College Board is committed to the principles of excellence and equity, and that commitment is embodied in all of its programs, services, activities, and concerns.

### Permission to Reprint Statement

The College Board intends this publication for noncommercial use by teachers for course and exam preparation; permission for any other use must be sought from the College Board. Teachers may reproduce this publication, in whole or in part, **in limited print quantities for noncommercial, face-to-face teaching purposes** and distribute up to 50 print copies from a teacher to a class of middle or high school students, with each student receiving no more than one copy.

This permission does not apply to any third-party copyrights contained within this publication.

When educators reproduce this publication for noncommercial, face-to-face teaching purposes, the following source line must be included:

***Democratization Briefing Paper. Copyright © 2005 by College Board. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. [www.collegeboard.com](http://www.collegeboard.com). This material may not be mass distributed, electronically or otherwise. This publication and any copies made from it may not be resold.***

No party may share this copyrighted material electronically—by fax, Web site, CD-ROM, disk, e-mail, electronic discussion group, or any other electronic means not stated here. In some cases—such as online courses or online workshops—the College Board *may* grant permission for electronic dissemination of its copyrighted materials. All intended uses not defined within ***noncommercial, face-to-face teaching purposes*** (including distribution exceeding 50 copies) must be reviewed and approved; in these cases, a license agreement must be received and signed by the requestor and copyright owners prior to the use of copyrighted material. Depending on the nature of the request, a licensing fee may be applied. Please use the required form accessible online. The form may be found at: [www.collegeboard.com/inquiry/cbpermit.html](http://www.collegeboard.com/inquiry/cbpermit.html).

## **Equity Policy Statement**

The College Board and the Advanced Placement Program encourage teachers, AP Coordinators, and school administrators to make equitable access a guiding principle for their AP programs. The College Board is committed to the principle that all students deserve an opportunity to participate in rigorous and academically challenging courses and programs. All students who are willing to accept the challenge of a rigorous academic curriculum should be considered for admission to AP courses. The Board encourages the elimination of barriers that restrict access to AP courses for students from ethnic, racial, and socioeconomic groups that have been traditionally underrepresented in the AP Program. Schools should make every effort to ensure that their AP classes reflect the diversity of their student population.

For more information about equity and access in principle and practice, please send an email to [apequity@collegeboard.org](mailto:apequity@collegeboard.org).

Copyright © 2005 by College Board. All rights reserved. College Board, AP Central, APCD, Advanced Placement Program, AP, AP Vertical Teams, Pre-AP, SAT, and the acorn logo are registered trademarks of the College Entrance Examination Board. Admitted Class Evaluation Service, CollegeEd, Connect to college success, MyRoad, SAT Professional Development, SAT Readiness Program, and Setting the Cornerstones are trademarks owned by the College Entrance Examination Board. PSAT/NMSQT is a trademark of the College Entrance Examination Board and National Merit Scholarship Corporation. Other products and services may be trademarks of their respective owners. Visit College Board on the Web: [www.collegeboard.com](http://www.collegeboard.com).

**For further information, visit [apcentral.collegeboard.com](http://apcentral.collegeboard.com).**

## **Democratization: A Briefing Paper for AP Comparative Government and Politics**

G. Bingham Powell, Jr., and Eleanor N. Powell

The introduction of democratic regimes in many countries that were previously ruled by military governments, one-party states, and personal dictatorships has been one of the most dramatic political trends of the last 30 years. By a **democratic regime**, we mean a set of institutions that allow the citizens to choose the makers of public policy in free, competitive elections. For such elections to be free and competitive implies that prospective voters enjoy fair choices between contending candidates and political parties. In addition, all adults in the country must be eligible and able to vote regardless of race, gender, poverty, ethnicity, or other discriminating characteristic.

Countries with free and fair elections for the real policymakers and eligibility of all adults meet the minimum requirements for a **procedural democracy**. It is important to be aware that the presence of elections, even elections allowing several parties to run candidates, is not sufficient to qualify a country as a democracy. In some countries, the military council, dominant party, or strong-man ruler makes the real decisions behind the scenes, with an elected legislature as a facade. In other countries, the opposition parties are so disadvantaged in what they can say, or how freely they can organize, or how fairly their votes are counted that they have no real chance. Their organizers and supporters may be threatened or murdered. Although sometimes such countries are called by such names as “guarded democracy” or “illiberal democracy,” we consider them forms of electoral authoritarianism, not democracies at all.<sup>1</sup>

In addition to the requisite free and fair competitive elections of a procedural democracy, many more political rights and civil liberties are necessary for a country to be deemed a **substantive democracy**. Freedom of the press, freedom of organization, independence of the courts, and equal treatment of minorities are just a few examples of the qualities that may be minimally present in a procedural democracy, but whose fuller realization is vital to a substantive democracy. In a substantive democracy, citizens have access to multiple sources of information. They can use political and civil rights to enable themselves to learn about politics and to try to influence the choices of others. They can form interest groups, trade unions, and political parties. Citizens are generally free from abuses of their personal integrity through repressive governmental threats, political murders, and disappearances, imprisonment, or torture for nonviolent political activity. Corruption is sufficiently controlled that the elected officials can meaningfully carry out public policies that the citizens desire. Sometimes we refer to achievements of substantive democracy as a “deepening” of democracy or an improvement in its democratic quality.<sup>2</sup> No nation has perfectly achieved all the elements of substantive democracy, but some have progressed much further than others. All substantive democracies are, by definition, also procedural democracies, but the reverse is not necessarily true. The presence of a procedural democracy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of substantive democracy.

**Democratization**, then, refers to the transformation process from a nondemocratic regime to a procedural democracy to a substantive democracy, either as the first government in a newly independent country or by replacing an

authoritarian system in an older one. It is important to note that a country may stagnate or stop altogether at some intermediate step in the democratization process and that the transformation to a substantive democracy may take years, decades, or never be completed.

Historically, only a handful of countries had introduced institutions of democracy before 1900. But the twentieth century saw what Samuel Huntington has called **three “waves” of democratization**.<sup>3</sup> The first of these waves had its origins in the late nineteenth century. It grew slowly under demands from increasingly educated and urbanized citizens. By the late 1920s, there were over 20 democracies among about 65 independent nations of the world, using very loose, procedural definitions. A number of these democracies collapsed, especially under the economic turmoil of the Great Depression of the early 1930s, or were overrun by aggressive Nazi Germany. The proportion of democracies declined, partially reversing the first wave.

The victory of the Allies in World War II and the breakup of the European colonial empires in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean introduced a second wave of newly democratic states. Some older democracies deepened the quality of their democratic institutions by extending full civil and political rights to women and minorities. However, a number of the new democracies failed soon after their introduction, while the 1960s and 1970s saw the overthrow of others, reversing the second wave.

Then, the late 1970s saw the beginning of a “third wave” of democratization, which started in Southern Europe, spread through Latin America and Asia, and accelerated with the collapse of the Soviet Union’s control of Eastern Europe in

1989. In 1991 the Soviet Union itself broke up into new states, many of which began as democracies. Electoral competition replaced various forms of authoritarian rule in many African states in the early 1990s. (The timing of democratization in different parts of the world can be compared by examining the lines for "region" in Graphs 1–6 below.) The beginning of the new millennium found somewhat competitive electoral institutions in nearly two-thirds of the world's 190 states, although only two-thirds of these (around 44 percent of the total) provided their citizens with sufficient substantive democracy to be called fully "free."<sup>4</sup>

### **Preconditions of Democratization**

Strictly speaking, there are no preconditions for introducing democracy. Any political system can adopt elections as the means for choosing policymakers and allow the civil and political rights that encourage meaningful participation and competition. Each new democracy emerges from a unique setting. The emergence reflects the particular commitments and concerns of its leaders and the citizens who support them, as well as the specific issues at stake in the society. However, two features of the setting in which the choice of regime is made greatly influence the likelihood that the outcome will be democratization: the **level of economic development** and the **international environment of democracy**.

#### **Level of Economic Development**

In traditional economies, such as Nigeria, the majority of the working population was and is employed in relatively inefficient agriculture, producing little more than enough to sustain a peasant life. Education and even literacy are

confined to the fortunate few. Primitive transportation and communication isolate most people in their own villages. Exploiting natural resources may provide extra income for the producers or rulers; a few cities dominate limited commercial life. As economies modernize, both agricultural and industrial production become far more efficient. The economies in developed countries such as Britain produce more than 10 times the yearly income per capita of the economies in undeveloped countries such as Nigeria.

Moreover, successful economic development causes, but also requires, great social as well as economic changes. These processes are sometimes called modernization. People move off the land and into cities. Better roads and railroads facilitate travel; radio, newspapers, and television begin to reach even small villages. New organizations, such as labor unions and professional associations, emerge to express citizens' interests. Industry and, eventually, services come to dominate employment. Mass education is needed to sustain technological efficiency. With better living standards and public health conditions, people live much longer, and the age composition of the society changes. New problems of preserving the environment and supporting the elderly come to the fore.

Higher levels of economic development and modernization are associated with greater demands for democracy and a greater capacity to sustain it, if it is introduced.<sup>5</sup> Larger segments of the society are educated and aware of national and international politics; they value the ability to shape public policies and can more easily be mobilized to press for the rights of influence. A far more efficient economy produces income to meet citizen's welfare needs without confiscating all the possessions of the better-off, easing political conflict.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, pressures from the growing urban working classes and middle class allies promoted democratization in newly economically developing Europe and its former colonies. Later, these forces continued encouraging the introduction of democracy as more countries developed. But it also became clear that, however introduced, democracy could more easily be supported in hard economic times in more educated and economically developed societies.<sup>6</sup> It is important to distinguish between short-term economic ups and downs and the underlying nature of the economy and society. Economic downturns, such as severe unemployment, can create some loss of support for democracy, but seldom threaten its continuation in a modernized, economically developed society. For these reasons, most economically developed societies today are democracies, while authoritarian governments are more likely in less developed societies.

### **International Environment of Democracy**

The second great factor that shapes the choice of regime in a democratic direction is the **international environment of democracy**. When a new state forms its constitution or new leaders take control after a nondemocratic regime is replaced, the decision about democracy is influenced by other states. This influence can take place in three ways. First, powerful states may **prohibit** democracy or **impose** it. After World War II when new democracies began in many parts of the world, the states of Eastern Europe were dominated by the Soviet Union, which enforced local Communist Party dictatorships until the late 1980s. The USSR intervened with troops in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 when local

leaders moved toward democratization. On the other hand, the victorious forces of Britain and the United States imposed new democratic governments in Germany and Japan, which had previously forced authoritarian control on the states they had overrun.

More recent attempts by the United States and Britain to impose democracy have been undertaken in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the successes of these attempts are still very much uncertain, their examples provide excellent insight into the challenges and necessary conditions for the implementation of democracy. The physical task of the first nationwide voter registration in a large country provided a major challenge in Afghanistan. Further, in both Afghanistan and Iraq security concerns and terrorist bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations of political officials threaten the very existence of free and fair elections. Security concerns also hamper the presence of international monitors to validate the election. These problems emphasize the importance of some **rule of law** necessary to achieve even a procedural democracy.

Second, the **prestige** of democracy in the world has waxed and waned over time, encouraged by outcomes of World War I and World War II and depressed by the brutal accomplishments of fascist dictatorships in the 1930s. With the apparent Soviet growth in the 1950s and 1960s, and the success of some military dictatorships in the 1970s, regimes other than democracy seemed to promise faster routes to prosperity. In the 1980s and 1990s, many nondemocratic regimes became discredited, their political and economic models seemingly less successful. After the fall of the Soviet Union, democracy became the only widely accepted symbol of commitment to popular welfare; even most dictators claim it as an eventual goal,

although democratic institutions may remain only an ideal or be subverted by manipulation and corruption.

The number of democracies in the region of the world in which a country is located can also have substantial influence on whether new rulers choose democratization. Partially, this is a matter of receiving permission and emulating democracy's prestige. But other democratic states also offer **incentives**. Economic alliances such as the European Union have made it clear that trade and, especially, membership is contingent on adopting a democratic regime. This incentive encouraged democratization in Spain, Portugal, and Greece earlier and now in Eastern Europe. With the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union, even before its disintegration in 1991, ceased supporting one-party states in Latin America and Africa. The United States, on the other hand, now more often moves toward encouraging democracy with aid and trade.

### **Processes of Transition to Democracy**

There are many paths to democracy. A new country, or an old country newly free from foreign domination, may be forming its first independent regime. Or, an established military government or personal dictatorship may break down, creating the opportunity for a democracy to emerge. But not all transitions result in democratization.

## **First Independence**

Sometimes, independence follows a long struggle against the country that has dominated it. In these cases, much depends on the values, skills, and organization of those who have led the independence struggle. George Washington refused to become a king after American independence. Nehru used the electoral experience and organizational alliances of the Congress Party to set India on a remarkable democratic journey. Other national heroes have not been so restrained, distrusting potential opponents and turning their independence movement into a one-party state or their guerrilla army into a military dictatorship.

At other times, the collapse or defeat in war of international empires has turned independence over to unprepared successor states, whose new leaders have little organizing experience. The weakening of the British, French, and Belgian empires after World War II encouraged and strengthened independence movements, which succeeded in introducing democratic institutions in many new African and Asian states. But stabilizing these economically underdeveloped and ethnically divided societies proved very difficult. After 10 years, few remained democracies. Nigeria is one example; freedom in 1960 was followed by intense conflict, and the First Republic was overthrown by a military coup in 1966. Most of Eastern Europe states newly freed from Soviet domination in 1989 swept new democratic movements to power, later encouraged by the prospect of membership in the European Union. The fragments of the Soviet Union freed in 1991 have found the democratic path far less certain.

## **Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes**

Many democracies emerge from established nondemocratic regimes. Poor economic performance and leadership struggles are common sources of **authoritarian breakdown**. But the processes of democratic transition take a variety of forms. Electoral competition and political freedoms may be introduced by the current rulers, sometimes gradually, as in Mexico in the 1990s. This process is often called "**democratization from above**" or "top-down" democratization. It may involve elaborate negotiation between rulers and political opponents or between "hard line" and "reform" factions within the authoritarian government.<sup>7</sup> In other countries, democratic reforms have been pressed rapidly by mass demonstrations from democratically inclined citizens, as in Eastern Europe after the Soviet Union withdrew control in 1989. This process is often called "**democratization from below**" or "bottom-up" democratization. Some democratic transitions involve elements from both "above" and "below."

The sources of authoritarian breakdowns depend in part on the nature of the authoritarian regime, with military governments, personalistic regimes, and one-party states having somewhat different vulnerabilities.<sup>8</sup> **Military dictatorships**, whose domination of society is held in place by the unified strength of armed soldiers, are difficult to resist, yet often fragile. Military institutions do not wish to become involved in deadly civil war against their own units. When a military defeat or poor economic performance causes the commanders to split, prodemocratic factions may negotiate a return to the barracks. Such transitions have often involved pacts between the military leadership and the new civilian authorities, promising military officers immunity from prosecution for their abuses of power.

The possibility of a professional role in the new democracy facilitates such pacts, but eradicating long-term influence over policy, and thus fully achieving substantive democracy, may be a difficult problem.

Severe economic problems, which can cause the authoritarian leadership to lose confidence and unity, are also a cause of failure of **personalistic authoritarian regimes**, held together by the personality and alliances of the individual leader and his family, sometimes his tribe or clan. There are usually enough resources to reward a narrow group of supporters in an economically underdeveloped society. But the inability to pay soldiers and bureaucrats will undermine the foundations of an authoritarian regime, making it vulnerable to a combination of external pressure and opposition movements, as in Africa in the 1990s.<sup>9</sup>

A significant source of instability in personalistic regimes is the death of the founder, who is typically unwilling to organize for an orderly succession. In such cases, a democratization opportunity opens up. It will be affected by the underlying economic development and international conditions mentioned above, but the outcome often depends on negotiation between forces of reaction and reform. It may be easier to bring about a democratic outcome in more prosperous, homogenous societies, with greater equality of income.

**Single-party authoritarian regimes**, such as the Soviet Union, Mexico (through the period of PRI domination), and China proved quite durable across the lives of the founders and their successors. Their organization, penetration of the society, and a unifying set of beliefs made it possible to recruit ambitious and talented people into the party and to crush potential opponents before they could

become widely organized. The key to democratic transitions in this kind of authoritarian system seems to be the unity and self-confidence inside the ruling political party. In the Soviet Union, the Communist Party had eventually lost its belief in either the long-term goals or the short-term economic efficacy of the controlling party; internal cleavages between “hard-liners” and “soft-liners” loosened control and eventually led to its breakup. The successor states, including Russia, have had diverse experiences with their new democracies. Critical roles in these countries have been played by the Communist Party members and top figures in the former economic bureaucracy. In Mexico, the PRI party controlled and coordinated political life through most of the twentieth century. A series of policy failures, including the painful devaluation of the peso, massive capital flight, and deep economic recession that began in 1994, combined with emerging discontent, eventually led the leaders to open the process to freedom and competition in the 1990s. In China, a democratization movement organized demonstrations in 1989, but after a brief hesitation the Communist Party unified around the hard-liners, forced out many reformers, and used the army against the peaceful demonstrators. The party reimposed central control of citizens and media. The democratization movement of 1989 failed.

### **Outcomes of Democratization**

What are the consequences of democratization? One issue concerns democracy itself. Will it achieve **democratic consolidation**, creating a stable political system in which all the major actors seeking political influence accept democratic competition, citizen participation, and the rule of law? In a consolidated

democracy, the democratization process has penetrated deeply through the institutions of competitive political parties, independent judiciaries, subordinate military, and security bureaucracies. Democracy has also become less fragile, supported by the values of the citizens and the commitments of the seekers of power to play by the democratic rules.<sup>10</sup> The second issue concerns the policy consequences of democratization. What does a democratic regime imply for citizens' welfare and security?

The most powerful factor shaping democratic consolidation is the level of economic development and modernization of the society. It is difficult to sustain democracies in very poor societies with low levels of education. Difficult does not mean impossible. India has been one of the world's poorest societies; even today nearly half of the citizens are illiterate. Yet, with a brief exception in the mid-1970s, India has sustained democracy at the national level (although not in some states) since it gained independence in 1947. Unfortunately, Nigeria is more typical, with democracy overthrown or aborted three times by the armed forces from 1966 through 1993, and the current democratization attempt facing serious difficulties. Such societies have few economic skills, limited institutional resources, weak civil societies, and many internal divisions. Too often, the armed forces or the remnants of the old regime's party or bureaucracy are the best organized elements in the new democracy, especially in the vulnerable early years of regime transition. Of course, in any democracy the political attitudes and values of the citizens, which are shaped by the general culture and by specific political experiences with democratic and authoritarian government, will be important for upholding democracy or allowing it to fail.

The institutions of democracy also play an important role in its performance. The relative successes of presidential systems and parliamentary systems, and of different election rules, have long been debated. Many political scientists have argued that presidential systems seem to have more difficulties in consolidating democracy.<sup>11</sup> Different constitutional rules often perform differently in different societies.

The failure to consolidate democracy may take various forms. Most dramatically, a fragile democracy may be threatened by violent intervention, as in the **military coups** in Nigeria in 1966 and 1983 and Pakistan in 1999 or the **executive coup** in Peru in 1992. In military coups, at least some of the officers use armed force to depose the elected civilian leadership. In executive coups, leading government officials, usually either a president or prime minister, declare a state of emergency and curtail democratic freedoms with at least implicit backing from the armed forces. These new regimes vary in their own repressiveness or stability, but democratic legislatures, free media, and electoral competition are prohibited, sometimes temporarily, often indefinitely. Even if an attempted coup by the military or the head of government is resisted, the threat of force diminishes the relevance of ordinary democratic processes.

On the other hand, initial democratization may more gradually fail to achieve its promise of deeper, more substantive democracy. Elected leaders may constrain freedom of the press, impose emergency rule on parts of the country, make policies by decree rather than through the legislature, limit electoral competition, press the judiciary to subvert the rule of law, and so forth. Minority groups may be abused or repressed. Widespread **corruption** may diminish the meaningfulness of electoral

competition as the shaper of public policy. Wealthy interests can buy the votes of legislators or the decisions of judges; small businesses purchase favorable regulatory permissions; parents must pay low-level bureaucrats for "free" immunization for their children. Public officials amass wealth in the midst of widespread poverty. These procedural democratic regimes are sometimes called "**illiberal**" or "**electoral**" or "**partial**" democracies to draw attention to authoritarian elements and distinguish these systems from free, substantive democracies.<sup>12</sup> About a quarter of the countries in the world could be described as "partial" or "illiberal" democracies. Russia is a country that in recent years has introduced substantial constraints on democratic freedoms, especially of the media, and been troubled by violence and corruption. Whether it is an example of "illiberal democracy" or of "electoral authoritarianism" is disputed.

If democracy is successfully consolidated, are there other policy consequences? The largest consequences are the most clearly documented. Democracies are somewhat less likely to experience war, and democracies almost never go to war with each other.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, while procedural democracies can on occasion be cruel to minority groups, even partial democracies are much less likely to engage in mass murder of minorities or political opponents than are authoritarian regimes. Both China (1966–1975) and Iran (1981–1992) are identified as countries having encouraged or allowed mass killings of thousands of political opponents.<sup>14</sup> Procedural democracies are more likely than authoritarian regimes to sustain rights to citizens' personal integrity, although full respect for these rights is not guaranteed.<sup>15</sup> (Also see the discussion in note 18 below about the relationship between political rights and civil liberties.)

Democracies also have some economic advantages. As the extreme example, no modern democracy seems to have experienced a mass famine.<sup>16</sup> When a region is threatened by famine, a free press and an active political opposition raises alarms to the country and the world; in authoritarian regimes, mass policy failures are more typically concealed. On the other hand, both the best and worst examples of economic growth appear in dictatorships. While many works of scholarship are divided on the issue of average economic performance, recent studies seem to find little average difference in growth between the two kinds of regimes, especially in the poorest countries.<sup>17</sup> Democracy may indirectly help economic growth by encouraging education, more secure property rights, and population control, but it does not guarantee economic success. Very poor countries find economic growth very difficult to attain regardless of the type of government.

A claim and a justification of democracy is that electoral competition and free participation induce governments to do what citizens want them to do. This claim of **democratic responsiveness** is complicated because of the many different things that citizens want and the many formidable obstacles that policies face. But there is good evidence that in countries attaining some level of economic development, substantive democracy is on average associated with higher levels of education, somewhat more equitable income distributions, and longer citizen life expectancies.

## **Democratization in Six Countries**

The six countries covered in the AP Comparative Politics Exam provide excellent examples of wide-ranging democratization experience and success. Great Britain and Mexico have fully democratized and are relatively successful democratic regimes today. Russia and Nigeria, on the other hand, have struggled and are now only partially democratic states at best, lacking in many elements of substantive democracy. Lastly, Iran and China have not democratized and have had very different experiences with democratic movements.

By using Freedom House's country ratings of political rights and civil liberties, we can compare the countries as they are today and as they have changed over the past 30 years.<sup>18</sup> These scores can be found at [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org), along with details about their components. Briefly, the political rights score includes "the right to vote and compete for public office and to elect representatives who have a decisive vote on public policies." Civil liberties include "the freedom to develop opinions, institutions, and personal autonomy without interference from the state." We have combined these scores to produce a rating from 1 to 13, where 1 is a completely undemocratic country with neither political rights nor civil liberties, and 13 is a country with substantive democracy, where the citizens possess extensive rights and liberties. In general, countries with scores under 5 are not even procedural democracies, while countries scoring 10 or above have made great progress toward substantive democracy. Scores in the middle range from 5 through 9 reflect a range of limitations in substantive democracy.

In addition to examining the scores of these countries, it is helpful to put their experiences in both a global and regional context of democratization. These


contexts can inhibit democratization or encourage democratic consolidation.

Therefore, we have created graphs that compare the scores of each country to that of its region and the world.

### **Fully Democratized: Great Britain and Mexico**

Great Britain is indisputably the most successful consolidated, substantive democracy of any of the six countries. Graph 1 below compares Great Britain to the average score in the other countries that are now in the European Union (including the new Eastern European member states) and the world generally. Over the past 30 years, Great Britain has consistently received the top (13) or nearly top (12) scores of both civil liberties and political rights.<sup>19</sup> The world average today rates about 8.5, which marks great improvement since its score just over 6 in the 1970s, reflecting the “third wave” of democratization. Graph 1 also shows that the European Union countries have historically been more democratic than the rest of the world. In the 1970s, the countries that are today members of the European Union were almost halfway between the scores Great Britain received and those received by the world as a whole. As Europe democratized, particularly Eastern Europe in the 1989 to 1991 period, the European Union line joins that of Great Britain as an almost fully democratized region.

Graph 1: Great Britain




In contrast to Great Britain, Mexico is a country that began the 1970s as only partially democratized with limited political rights and civil liberties. Elections were consistently held during this period, but one party was always victorious: the PRI, which controlled and manipulated the election process. The PRI first allowed an opposition party to win a state election in 1989 and finally lost its majority in the national legislature in 1997. It was not until the landmark election of 2000 in which Vicente Fox was elected president that the PRI's 71-year monopoly over presidential power ended.

An examination of Graph 2 below shows the dramatic democratic improvement that has taken place in Mexico over the past five years. Graph 2 also shows the experience of the rest of Latin America, which was clearly a part of Samuel Huntington's "third wave" of democratization. From the mid-1970s to the

present, Latin America improved from a low score of about 6.5 to a high of just over 10. Mexico's democratization took place noticeably later than that of the rest of the Latin American region, and today Mexico is slightly more democratic than the Latin American average and much more democratic than the world as a whole. It is perhaps too soon to be confident that Mexican democracy is fully consolidated and will not experience reversals, but its achievement is impressive.

Graph 2: Mexico




### Partially Democratized: Russia and Nigeria

The citizens of Nigeria have seen wild swings in their civil liberties and political rights as attempts at civilian government and democracy (as well as some military governments) have been interrupted by military coups. Graph 3 below provides a clear visual illustration of this pattern. The late 1970s show the softening of the military dictatorship, and that power was eventually handed over to a civilian government in 1979. However, this brief attempt at democracy was abruptly ended

by a military coup in 1983. A succession of military dictatorships and coups followed. In 1993 the military leadership annulled a presidential election (just as the votes were being counted) and also abolished newly elected regional offices. This can be seen dramatically in Graph 3 as Nigeria hits the lowest possible score of 1. The dictatorship again softened and in 2000 handed power over to a civilian government. The partial, procedural democracy has survived thus far, although limited by very extensive corruption. In recent years, it has also suffered from severe religious conflict; between 1999 and 2003, about 10,000 people were killed in religious strife.<sup>20</sup>

Another important aspect of Graph 3 is the democratic status of the African region. Unlike Latin America and the European Union countries, which were consistently more democratic than the rest of the world, Africa is consistently less democratic than the rest of the world. It should be noted, however, that Africa as a region has made important democratic progress since the late 1980s, raising its average country score from a discouraging 4 to a partially democratic 6.4. In fact, by 2003 the scores of Nigeria and Africa had almost converged, making today's Nigeria very representative of the political rights and civil liberties of other countries in the region, while still noticeably below that of the world as a whole.


Graph 3: Nigeria



Russia's experience with democratization was very different from that of Nigeria. Life in the Communist USSR was largely without civil liberties and political rights. Major change began in the USSR when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and began his programs of glasnost and perestroika. Gorbachev came to power in what can be seen from Graph 4 below as the low point in recent rights and liberties in the USSR. Almost immediately there was a dramatic increase in openness and freedom, which eventually led to the fall of the Berlin Wall, lifting of the iron curtain, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the lines representing Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union diverge. There is an immediate positive spike in Russian democracy shortly after the split, while average rights and liberties in the other countries formerly part of the Soviet Union actually fell.<sup>21</sup> In the decade following the split, the rest of the countries of the former Soviet Union made only modest democratic progress, while

Russia began losing rights and liberties in the late 1990s under Yeltsin. Journalists were harassed, independent television networks were suppressed, and reporting on the military conflict in Chechnya was severely limited. Since the transfer of power to President Putin, Russia has remained stagnant at a score of 5, suggesting that while elections are still taking place, Russia is not a consolidated, substantive democracy. It is interesting to note that despite the initial divergence in democracy between Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union, since 2000 their averages are nearly identical. While the experience of Russia today is similar to that of the rest of the former Soviet Union, it is less democratic than the world as a whole, and far less democratic than the European Union countries, which are shown at the top of Graph 4.


Graph 4: Russia



## Undemocratic: Iran and China

Unlike the other countries studied in the AP Comparative Government curriculum, Iran and China have had limited experience with democracy. Both countries have been consistently repressive and authoritarian. In Iran, the 1978–1979 revolution brought about the fall of the shah and the end of that repressive regime. It was at this point that Iran’s political rights and civil liberties peaked with a score of 5, as can be seen in Graph 5. That brief moment of relative freedom ended quickly. Radical Islamic leaders gained control and forcefully crushed political opposition. Ultimate political authority was given to religious leaders, and radical policies were put in place that included replacing secular courts with religious ones, limiting the rights of women, and media control. Recently there has been some easing of political censorship and even temporary electoral successes of reformers, as seen in the slight improvement in the graph in 1997, when a moderate candidate, Mohammed Khatami, won the presidential election. But the clerical rulers have sustained firm authoritarian controls over Iran’s politics and society.<sup>22</sup> Graph 5 also makes clear the disparity between rights and liberties in the Middle East and the world as a whole. The Middle East is far less democratic and has remained consistently so. While the world as a whole has become more democratic, the Middle East has remained stagnant, thus increasing the gap between the two.


Graph 5: Iran



Over the past 30 years, China has also been generally repressive and undemocratic. As clearly shown in Graph 6, China's score has ranged from the lowest possible score of 1 to a high point of just 3. After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, economic reformers gained control of the Communist Party. The rise of Deng Xiaoping, one of the most prominent of these reformers, brought about a slightly less repressive period in China's recent history. Deng actually approved and implemented many of the demands by the protesters that were written on the Democracy Wall. During the period from 1978 to 1989, there were three waves of protests, which were all illegal, but were also linked to reformers and reform movements within the government. Popularly elected village committees were introduced in 1987 and continue today, providing Chinese citizens some experience with political competition, although the degree of local democracy seems to vary

greatly.<sup>23</sup> Political liberalization at the national level ended abruptly in 1989 when protesters in Tiananmen Square were brutally massacred by a government fearing for its survival. It was at this point that many moderate reformers within the government were forced out, and the pace of political reform was dramatically reduced. The Asian region, shown in the middle of Graph 6, contains a great variety of regimes, including authoritarian regimes such as Pakistan and North Korea and substantive democratic regimes such as Japan and, recently, South Korea. Its average has consistently been below that of the world total, but China has consistently remained among the least democratic Asian systems.

Graph 6: China



### **Conclusion: Democratization and Its Prospects**

The twentieth century was a century of democratization. Before 1900, only a handful of countries, at most, had introduced democratic regimes. By the century's end, nearly half of the countries in the world were somewhat substantive democracies (despite some imperfections), and another quarter had introduced some degree of electoral competition. The democratization trend of the twentieth century had gained new momentum in the "third wave" from the late 1970s through the middle 1990s. The democratization trend brought many benefits to the citizens whose nations experienced it. While all democratic regimes have flaws, democratization in general has improved citizens' security and welfare, as well as given them a more equitable role in making public policies.

We cannot yet tell what will be the story of democratization in the twenty-first century. In the last five years, the proportion of full democracies in the world has been fairly stable, with new democratization in countries such as Mexico and Nigeria countered by the overthrow of democracy in countries such as Pakistan and the erosion of democratic conditions in countries such as Russia. Some ebbs and flows are inevitable. Even countries such as India, where values and institutions seem strongly supportive of democracy, are rendered fragile by low levels of education, economies with huge traditional sectors, corruption, and deep religious cleavages. Nigeria seems even more fragile, because of its record of military intervention and intense strife. On the other hand, while China has stubbornly suppressed most democratization efforts thus far, economic and social development has been proceeding rapidly, creating new pressures for democratization and greatly improving its prospects for survival if it is introduced.

If the past is any guide, much will depend on worldwide economic and international conditions. Continuing advances in education and economic development would help consolidate democracy in Latin America, Central Europe, and Asia. Such development gains are desperately needed to encourage and consolidate democracy in Africa and the former Soviet Union countries. The fate of internationally and regionally powerful countries will have an additional effect on democratization or democratic consolidation of their neighbors. For this reason, the outcomes of democratization in Russia, China, Nigeria, and Iran have implications outside their own borders. Moreover, the new worldwide trends in international security and trade affect many nations. It is more difficult to sustain democratic liberties when confronted by international terror. Other unforeseen threats will no doubt emerge. Against these it will be up to citizens and leaders in current democratic regimes to discover responses that protect their security and prosperity without threatening democracy itself. Because democratic regimes are founded on the principle of responsiveness to citizens, those citizens bear responsibility for defending their freedoms.

### **Critical Terms for Understanding Democratization**

Authoritarian breakdown	Illiberal democracy
Authoritarian regime	International environment of democracy
Corruption	Military coup
Democratic consolidation	Military authoritarian regime
Democratic regime	Personalistic authoritarian regime
Democratic responsiveness	Procedural democracy
Democratization from "above" and "below"	Rule of law
Economic development level	Single-party authoritarian regime
Executive coup	Substantive democracy
	Waves of democratization (three)

---

<sup>1</sup> For a discussion of the conceptual issues, see David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research," *World Politics* 49 (1997): 430–451. For specific classifications and discussions of the dividing line between electoral democracy and electoral authoritarianism, see Larry Diamond, Andreas Schedler, Steven Levitsky and Lucian Way, and Nicolas Van de Walle, "Elections Without Democracy?" in *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2002): 21–80.

<sup>2</sup> Some scholars also include any greater economic equality, increased education, or expansive welfare policies in their conception of substantive democracy. Here we attempt to limit our conception of substantive democracy to rights and freedoms that can directly create more equal political relations between citizens and with their governments. However, extreme social and economic inequalities in a society can limit the quality of democracy. See the articles in *Journal of Democracy* 15 (October 2004) discussing various elements in the "Quality of Democracy."

<sup>3</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

<sup>4</sup> Adrian Karatnycky, "The 1999 Freedom House Survey: A Century of Progress," *Journal of Democracy* 11 (January 2000): 187–200.

<sup>5</sup> However, sometimes the greater economic resources may at least for a time help sustain a dictatorial regime against such demands.

<sup>6</sup> Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000): ch. 2; Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, "Endogenous Democratization," *World Politics* 55 (July 2003).

<sup>7</sup> Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 4 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Gretchen Casper and Michelle M. Taylor, *Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996).

<sup>8</sup> Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (June 1999): 115–144.

<sup>9</sup> Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

<sup>10</sup> Larry Diamond et al., eds., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1997).

<sup>11</sup> Among many examples are Juan Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," *Journal of Democracy* 1 (1990): 51–69; Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Przeworski, *Democracy and Development* (2000): ch. 2.

<sup>12</sup> As explained above, analysts are somewhat divided in their use of these terms and their application to incomplete, procedural democracies or to authoritarian systems with some competitive elements. Sometimes political systems with some democratic elements and severe flaws are called "hybrid" regimes.

<sup>13</sup> The political science literature showing that democracies do not fight each other is very large. See, for example, Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

<sup>14</sup> Barbara Harff, "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder Since 1955," *American Political Science Review* 97 (February 2003): 57–74.

---

<sup>15</sup> Steven C. Poe, C. Neal Tate, and Linda Camp Keith, "Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976–1993," *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1999): 291–313.

<sup>16</sup> Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, *Hunger and Public Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

<sup>17</sup> Przeworski, *Democracy and Development* (2000): chs. 3, 5; on indirect effects, Yi Feng, *Democracy, Governance, and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003).

<sup>18</sup> The Freedom House political rights and civil liberties scores are estimated by a team of 30 writers/analysts and senior-level academic advisors, in consultation with regional experts. The political rights score is based on a checklist of 10 items spread across three categories, each of which is evaluated on a scale from 0 to 4. The categories on the political rights checklist are electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government. Items on the checklist include: "Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through free and fair elections? Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it operate with openness and transparency? Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making process?" In a practical sense, it would be almost impossible to receive a mediocre score on political rights without at least a procedural democracy and impossible to receive a perfect score without a substantive democracy. The ratings on political rights and civil liberties are closely related, and the scores rarely diverge by more than a few points. By examining the items on the civil liberties checklist, the reason for the similarity in scores becomes readily apparent. The civil liberties checklist includes 15 questions spread across four categories; again, each item is rated from 0 to 4. The four categories on the civil liberties checklist are freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. Some of the items on the civil liberties checklist include: "Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion? Is there an independent judiciary? Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?" The categories and items included in the civil liberties checklist are vital for a substantive democracy. Without rule of law, freedom of the press, and the other vital freedoms it includes, it would be impossible to hold free and fair elections. The Freedom House Organization then uses the scores on these checklists to establish ratings from 1 to 7 on political rights and from 1 to 7 on civil rights, so that possible total scores range from 2 to 14. Under their system, the lower scores represent the highest levels of freedom. For the sake of clarity in this paper, we have reversed the scores, so that the combined scores range from 1 to 13, with high scores representing the greatest level of freedom and democracy. It is worth noting that in the middle range, what appear to be identical scores in two different countries can, in reality, mean the availability of a very different range of rights available to its citizens. The independence of the media and absence of an independent judiciary in one country and a fully independent judiciary and state-controlled media in another might appear identical in these combined scores. Further, it should be noted that there have been minor methodological changes in the score calculations over the more than 30 years since its creation. It is because of these minor methodological changes that there appear to be minor variations in scores, where no actual changes in rights and freedoms on the ground have taken place.

<sup>19</sup> The scores are for Great Britain only and explicitly exclude Northern Ireland, which Freedom House rates separately, although both are part of the country called the United Kingdom. According to Freedom House, the one point decline after 1989 reflects only a methodological adjustment.

<sup>20</sup> Robert Mundt and Oladimeji Aborisade, "Nigeria," in Gabriel Almond et al., *Comparative Politics Today* (New York: Longman, 2003): 712.

---

<sup>21</sup> There are great differences in democratic achievement from country to country among these new nations. The three Baltic countries, which have now become part of the European Union, are counted in this graph in the European Union average, not in the former Soviet Union average.

<sup>22</sup> Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).

<sup>23</sup> Melanie Manion, "The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside," *American Political Science Review* 90 (1996): 736–48.



**CollegeBoard**

Advanced Placement  
Program

**AP<sup>®</sup> Comparative  
Government  
and Politics**  
Briefing Paper:  
Globalization

Matthew Krain  
The College of Wooster  
Wooster, Ohio

connect to college success™  
[www.collegeboard.com](http://www.collegeboard.com)

## The College Board: Connecting Students to College Success

The College Board is a not-for-profit membership association whose mission is to connect students to college success and opportunity. Founded in 1900, the association is composed of more than 4,700 schools, colleges, universities, and other educational organizations. Each year, the College Board serves over three and a half million students and their parents, 23,000 high schools, and 3,500 colleges through major programs and services in college admissions, guidance, assessment, financial aid, enrollment, and teaching and learning. Among its best-known programs are the SAT<sup>®</sup>, the PSAT/NMSQT<sup>®</sup>, and the Advanced Placement Program<sup>®</sup> (AP<sup>®</sup>). The College Board is committed to the principles of excellence and equity, and that commitment is embodied in all of its programs, services, activities, and concerns.

### Permission to Reprint Statement

The College Board intends this publication for noncommercial use by teachers for course and exam preparation; permission for any other use must be sought from the College Board. Teachers may reproduce this publication, in whole or in part, **in limited print quantities for noncommercial, face-to-face teaching purposes** and distribute up to 50 print copies from a teacher to a class of middle or high school students, with each student receiving no more than one copy.

This permission does not apply to any third-party copyrights contained within this publication.

When educators reproduce this publication for noncommercial, face-to-face teaching purposes, the following source line must be included:

***Briefing Paper: Globalization. Copyright © 2005 by College Board. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. [www.collegeboard.com](http://www.collegeboard.com). This material may not be mass distributed, electronically or otherwise. This publication and any copies made from it may not be resold.***

No party may share this copyrighted material electronically—by fax, Web site, CD-ROM, disk, e-mail, electronic discussion group, or any other electronic means not stated here. In some cases—such as online courses or online workshops—the College Board *may* grant permission for electronic dissemination of its copyrighted materials. All intended uses not defined within ***noncommercial, face-to-face teaching purposes*** (including distribution exceeding 50 copies) must be reviewed and approved; in these cases, a license agreement must be received and signed by the requestor and copyright owners prior to the use of copyrighted material. Depending on the nature of the request, a licensing fee may be applied. Please use the required form accessible online. The form may be found at: [www.collegeboard.com/inquiry/cbpermit.html](http://www.collegeboard.com/inquiry/cbpermit.html).

## **Equity Policy Statement**

The College Board and the Advanced Placement Program encourage teachers, AP Coordinators, and school administrators to make equitable access a guiding principle for their AP programs. The College Board is committed to the principle that all students deserve an opportunity to participate in rigorous and academically challenging courses and programs. All students who are willing to accept the challenge of a rigorous academic curriculum should be considered for admission to AP courses. The Board encourages the elimination of barriers that restrict access to AP courses for students from ethnic, racial, and socioeconomic groups that have been traditionally underrepresented in the AP Program. Schools should make every effort to ensure that their AP classes reflect the diversity of their student population.

For more information about equity and access in principle and practice, please send an email to [apecuity@collegeboard.org](mailto:apecuity@collegeboard.org).

Copyright © 2005 by College Board. All rights reserved. College Board, AP Central, APCD, Advanced Placement Program, AP, AP Vertical Teams, Pre-AP, SAT, and the acorn logo are registered trademarks of the College Entrance Examination Board. Admitted Class Evaluation Service, CollegeEd, Connect to college success, MyRoad, SAT Professional Development, SAT Readiness Program, and Setting the Cornerstones are trademarks owned by the College Entrance Examination Board. PSAT/NMSOT is a trademark of the College Entrance Examination Board and National Merit Scholarship Corporation. Other products and services may be trademarks of their respective owners. Visit College Board on the Web: [www.collegeboard.com](http://www.collegeboard.com).

**For further information, visit [apcentral.collegeboard.com](http://apcentral.collegeboard.com).**

## Briefing Paper: Globalization

Matthew Krain

The College of Wooster

### What Is Globalization?<sup>1</sup>

Despite popular (mis)conceptions, globalization is not some formal structure of the current international system, from which countries may decide to opt in or out; it is not a meaningless catchall buzzword; it is not imposed by some menacing oppressor, nor is it necessarily a good or a bad thing in and of itself. Globalization is a *process* that results in the growing interconnectedness of the world. Globalization can be defined in a variety of ways, but the most common understanding of the term is the increasing **interdependence** of economies, political systems, and societies on a global scale. The process is usually understood to be driven by technological innovations that allow for greater interconnectedness between and among peoples, groups, countries, and international and transnational organizations. As the book jacket of Thomas Friedman's popular exploration of the concept notes, globalization is "the integration of capital, technology, and information across national borders, in a way that is creating a single

---

<sup>1</sup> In the last few years, a wide variety of scholars, journalists, activists, and policymakers have addressed the issues presented by globalization. As a result, there is a plethora of definitions of the concept *globalization*, most of which are addressed in whole or in part by the arguments discussed in this paper. For a clearer picture of the diversity of definitions of globalization, compare the discussions of the concept in at least three of the sources listed in the annotated bibliographies at the end of this paper. For the sake of making this difficult concept more teachable and more accessible, I focus in the rest of this paper on the most widely used definition of globalization within the discipline of political science, and examine differing implications of this perspective on political, economic, and social policies and interactions within, between, and among actors around the globe.

global market and, to some degree, a global village.”<sup>2</sup> The result is a world that seems ever smaller, and a pace of interaction that seems ever faster.

Visualizing globalization as a process that generates an increasingly complex web of interconnections, or “a dense network of international flows of goods, services, capital, information, ideas, and people,”<sup>3</sup> implies both a broadening of these interconnections across borders and a deepening of the intensity and importance of those ties. The effects of policies or events are felt by a wider range of people and countries and have a more substantial impact on those who are affected than ever before. Issues that once affected a particular country or region now have broader implications. Moreover, issues themselves are now more interrelated than ever before.

Each actor in the international system is tied together more closely and in numerous ways. As a result, each becomes more sensitive to the decisions or actions of others and more vulnerable to the effects of others' choices and actions. This increasing **sensitivity** and **vulnerability** requires states to think about policy challenges in new ways and allows other countries and nonstate actors new ways to influence outcomes around the globe. Governments face pressures from other countries likely to be affected by their policy choices, from international organizations, from transnational actors, and from other cross-border groups below the level of the state. Regardless whether one is a blue-collar worker in Britain or a *bazaari* (merchant) in Iran, a peasant farmer in Chiapas or an oligarch in Russia, a multinational corporation or an activist, an individual or a government, or whether one considers one's primary allegiance to be to one's job, city or

---

<sup>2</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux).

<sup>3</sup> Joan Spero and Jeffrey A. Hart, *The Politics of International Economic Relations*, 6th ed. (Thomson/Wadsworth, 2003): 407.

region, ethnic group, religious group, country, or a larger global community, the question is not *whether* one is affected by globalization, but rather, *how*.

### **Historical Perspective**

Globalization is nothing new. Consider the following quote: *"When has the entire earth ever been so closely joined together? Who has ever had more power and more machines, such that with a single impulse, with a single movement of a finger, entire nations are shaken?"* Is this a description of modern-day economic interdependence, driven by e-transactions via the latest computer technology? Is it a warning about the potential for another East Asian Financial Crisis, or concern about the possible impact of transnational terrorist groups with weapons of mass destruction? No—it was written by German philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder in 1774!

A brief review of world history suggests that globalization is an ongoing process that has unfolded in the past in ways remarkably similar in form if not content to the present. For example, what the Europeans called the "Age of Discovery" was simply the globalization of its day. Columbus and his contemporaries were attempting to upgrade access to global markets—in their case, by finding a faster route to India. They were able to attempt this because of technological innovations in the leading sectors of their economy. Back then, the development of cheaper, faster, sturdier ships enabled the flow of highly valued goods such as spices and gold; today, the development of cheaper, faster, sturdier microelectronics enables the flow of highly prized information and dollars. The story of globalization in any age is a story of technological innovation leading to greater global **integration**.

What has changed dramatically over time is how complex and extensive this web of interconnections has become. Issues that once were dealt with in isolation must now be thought of as being linked to other issues. For example, economic policies may have environmental impacts, environmental policies have social impacts, and social policies have political ramifications, all of which are likely to affect the original economic condition that the economic policy was formulated to deal with in the first place. Where once states worried only about the domestic consequences of their own domestic policies, they must now consider international, regional, and local impacts and reactions. As one analyst has noted, "It is no longer possible in an age of mass communication to 'play to the home audience' without the world also listening."<sup>4</sup>

Where countries were once constrained only by their own willingness and ability to implement policies, they must now consider how their interdependence with others constrains their choices. And where previously states were sheltered from the choices of other countries, the increasing interconnectedness makes it more likely that states will have to cope with decisions made by others, even others halfway around the globe. Decisions by the Thai government in 1997 regarding the value of their currency contributed to (but did not cause) an economic crisis of global proportions that affected policy choices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Russia, and the United States as much as it affected Thailand and neighboring Malaysia. China's mishandling of the SARS outbreak allowed the disease to spread globally, requiring a response by individual countries as well as international organizations like the World Health Organization.

---

<sup>4</sup> Jeffrey Sachs, "The Globalization of Mass Politics," *Project Syndicate* (February 2003), [www.project-syndicate.org/commentaries/commentary\\_text.php?id=1118&lang=1&m=contributor](http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentaries/commentary_text.php?id=1118&lang=1&m=contributor).

Perhaps it is no wonder that globalization's effects have been compared to the analogy used to describe chaos theory—when a butterfly flaps its wings on one side of the earth it may, through a series of interconnected and snowballing effects, ultimately contribute to a hurricane on the other side of the globe.

That does not mean that globalization is an irreversible phenomenon, or one immune to national policy changes. For example, by many measures the global economy was more integrated at the end of the nineteenth century than it is today. However, globalization retreated in the first half of the twentieth century in the face of protectionist policies and a wave of aggressive nationalism in many countries at the heart of the global economy.<sup>5</sup>

National governments have the option of erecting barriers to international economic integration and globalization. States have a number of tools at their disposal: tariff or nontariff barriers impeding international trade, official controls on international capital movements, or immigration laws that prevent workers from offering their labor services in foreign countries. Countries may also utilize more subtle “behind-the-border” barriers by strictly adhering to and enforcing national regulatory systems, careful allotment of license granting, or government procurement practices that discriminate against foreign suppliers. Countries may limit the influx of materials from the outside, censor the Internet, cut off ties with potential trading partners, withdraw from international organizations or treaties, deny access to international investors, or repress local chapters of transnational organizations or movements.

---

<sup>5</sup> Horst Kohler, “Working for a Better Globalization,” remarks by the managing director of the International Monetary Fund at the Conference on Humanizing the Global Economy (Washington, D.C., January 28, 2002).

Yet most countries do not use all of the tools at their disposal to isolate themselves from the impacts of globalization. Countries with political systems that are more strictly controlled from the center, such as Iran and China, may choose to attempt to limit access to outside information or to cushion themselves from Western political ideas. Newly liberalized developing countries such as Nigeria and Mexico may still attempt to limit foreign corporate influence in key economic sectors such as oil. Countries recovering from economic crises such as Mexico and Russia may attempt to control the flow of capital more closely. And advanced industrial democracies such as Great Britain and the United States may attempt to insulate their domestic labor force from competition from cheaper labor abroad by occasionally employing some protectionist measures. In most instances, however, most countries see more advantages in plugging into the vast, growing network of interdependence that is globalization than in trying to insulate themselves from its effects. As a result, with rare exceptions (such as North Korea, Burma, and Cuba) most countries around the world try to reap the benefits of, and simultaneously cope with the problems associated with, globalization.

### **Economic Globalization**


In recent years, a rapidly increasing share of global economic activity has been taking place between people who live in different countries (rather than in the same country). This economic globalization is a process that leads to the reduction in official obstacles to cross-border economic transactions. This often makes it as inexpensive to do business with foreigners as it is to do business at home, thus reducing the advantages held by domestic businesses. The pace of international economic integration accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s, as governments everywhere reduced policy barriers that hampered

international trade and investment. Globalization has thus been characterized by the liberalization of domestic markets coupled with opening them up to the outside world.

According to neoclassical liberal economic theory, reducing tariff barriers and other impediments to the free movement of goods and capital, which makes it easier for countries to trade with each other, lifts the wealth of all states by allowing them to concentrate on those things in which they have greatest expertise. In general, poor countries that have lowered their tariff barriers have seen overall increases in employment and national income because labor and capital shifts to capital-generating export industries. In addition to providing jobs, foreign companies moving to developing countries often bring with them higher wages and better working conditions compared with those offered by domestic companies. The experiences of India and South Korea suggest that as countries increase their levels of growth and development, their wage levels rise, and a shift from labor-intensive industry to more capital and knowledge-intensive industry is seen.

Consumers and governments around the world are continually spending more on goods and services imported from other countries. A growing share of what countries produce is sold to foreigners as exports. As Figure 1 demonstrates, among developed countries the share of a given country's international trade in its total economic output (exports plus imports relative to gross domestic product) rose from 32.3 to 37.9 percent between 1990 and 2001. For developing countries, it rose from 33.8 to 48.9 percent in the

same period.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, developing countries increased their share of global trade relative to the developed world from 19 percent in 1971 to 29 percent in 1999.<sup>7</sup>



Corporations based in one country have increasingly made investments to establish and run business operations in other countries. This type of economic transaction, known as **foreign direct investment (FDI)**, is now the largest form of private capital inflow to developing countries.<sup>8</sup> FDI is more than just capital investment, though. It also brings with it technical information, jobs, and the transmission of ideas. For example, China has attracted more FDI (nearly \$500 billion) than any other developing country since opening

---

<sup>6</sup> The World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2003* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003).

<sup>7</sup> IMF staff, "Globalization: Threat or Opportunity?" *IMF Issues Brief* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2000), [www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200.htm](http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200.htm).

<sup>8</sup> World Bank, "Assessing Globalization," Working Paper: PREM Economic Policy Group and Development Economics Group (April 2000).

up its economy to the global marketplace. With that foreign direct investment has come jobs. Globalization has its most direct effect on people through their work and employment. Indeed, China's increasingly open and outward-focused economic policies are associated with a reduction of poverty from 28 percent of the population in 1978—the first year of Deng Xiaoping's liberalization policies—to 9 percent in 1998.<sup>9</sup> China's opening to world trade has brought it growth in income from \$1,460 per capita in 1980 to \$4,120 per capita by 1999. In 1980, the average United States citizen earned 12.5 times as much as the average Chinese citizen. By 1999, they were only earning 7.4 times as much.<sup>10</sup> While a recent UN study found that the number of people living in absolute poverty worldwide declined from 1.2 billion in 1990 to 1.1 billion in 2000, most of the improvement was seen in China and India, two populous countries with increasingly open and outward-looking economies over that period of time.<sup>11</sup>

### **Multinational Corporations**

The most important source of FDI and a key actor in the era of globalization is the **multinational corporation (MNC)**. MNCs play a dominant role in trade and financial interactions in the global economy. Some even argue that MNCs drive the current wave of globalization. They fan out from their home countries in search of new markets, more

---

<sup>9</sup> Jagdish Bhagwati, *In Defense of Globalization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

<sup>10</sup> World Bank, *Globalisation, Growth, and Poverty: Building an Inclusive World Economy*, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003), [www.econ.worldbank.org/prt/subpage.php?sp=2477](http://www.econ.worldbank.org/prt/subpage.php?sp=2477).

<sup>11</sup> Elizabeth Becker, "U.N. Study Finds Global Trade Benefits Are Uneven," *New York Times* (February 24, 2004): C5.

resources, better investments, and cheaper labor in foreign host countries. In doing so, they weave broader and deeper interconnections between and among national and subnational units.

MNCs played a complex and often problematic role in globalization even before the Dutch West India Company helped colonize the Americas and run the African slave trade. Yet never have MNCs proliferated so rapidly and had such an impact on the global economy as they do today. While almost 7,000 multinational corporations existed in 1970, by 1997 that number had grown to over 53,000, as seen in Figure 2. Of course, as Figure 3 demonstrates, almost 43,500 of those MNCs originated from developed countries (30,000 of which had homes in the United States or European Union), while only about 9,500 originated from the developing world. While Japan is home to over 4,200 MNCs, even rapidly globalizing China is home to less than 400.<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 1998* (UNCTAD, 1998).

Figure 2. Total Number of Multinational Corporations (MNCs), 1970 and 1997

(Source: World Investment Report 1998, UNCTAD)





Figure 3. Multinational Corporations (MNCs), by Level of Development, 1997  
(Source: World Investment Report 1998, UNCTAD)



Multinationals can often create competition between countries vying for investment. For example, for years MNCs have set up plants in Mexico's *maquiladora* zone to take advantage of cheap labor. This has boosted the general economic fortunes of Mexico but has not alleviated poverty. However, many MNCs are now leaving Mexico in favor of investing in China, Malaysia, and Guatemala, where labor has become cheaper relative to Mexico.

In an increasingly globalized world, the MNC has become a political as well as economic force with which to be reckoned. For example, in 1998, when Pakistan was about to test its nuclear weapons in retaliation to India's tests, the first on the scene to try to convince the Pakistani government not to engage in the test was not the United States ambassador, nor was it secretary-general of the United Nations. Rather, the first person from outside Pakistan to react was a representative from the Coca-Cola Corporation! Nuclear testing would have yielded sanctions on Pakistan by many Western countries, making it difficult for Coca-Cola to operate in what is otherwise a very lucrative market for them.

MNCs now account for one-third of the world's exports. The top 10 multinational corporations have sales figures that are more than the gross domestic product of 170 countries. Exxon Mobil's revenues were larger than the gross domestic product of all but the top 21 countries in the world, including major oil producers such as Norway, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, as well as the world's fourth most populous country, Indonesia.<sup>13</sup> The wealth and strong bargaining position relative to the often poorer (and weaker)

---

<sup>13</sup>. Joan Spero and Jeffrey A. Hart, *The Politics of International Economic Relations*, 6th ed., (Thomson/Wadsworth, 2003): 119–120; World Bank, *World Development Report 2001* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001).

developing countries in which they invest highlights just one of a series of inequalities exacerbated by globalization.

### **Globalization and Inequality**

Globalization benefits some more than others. Most international trade and investment is concentrated in North America, Europe, and East Asia. States that have already prospered from globalization continue to do so, while others—Bangladesh, Bolivia, Belize, Burma—are left behind. Inequality between the haves and have-nots within and among countries has increased dramatically over the last 20 years, and the share of global income of the poorest people on earth has dropped from 2.3 percent to 1.4 percent in the last decade. A recent United Nations report found that 188 million people worldwide (or 6.2 percent of the global labor force) are unemployed. The report also found that the gap between rich and poor nations has widened, with countries representing 14 percent of the world's population accounting for half the world's trade and foreign investment.<sup>14</sup>

China, Mexico, India, Nigeria, and other countries that have liberalized their economies and have taken advantage of economic globalization have also seen dramatic increases in inequality within their countries. Only recently have these countries even begun to attempt to rectify these inequalities. For example, in January 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao vowed to raise peasant incomes and

---

<sup>14</sup> Elizabeth Becker, "U.N. Study Finds Global Trade Benefits Are Uneven," *New York Times* (February 24, 2004): C5.

improve the conditions of factory workers in an attempt to stress both economic progress and fairness and justice.<sup>15</sup>

Countries such as China, Mexico, Nigeria, and other recipients of FDI have seen an increase in urbanization as well, as much of the workforce moves from a more traditional life, often as subsistence farmers, to life as the working class in large megacities. The 1998 UN Human Development Report estimates that by 2015, almost 50 percent of people living in the developing world will be living in cities (as compared to the 24.7 percent who lived in cities in 1970 and the 37.4 percent who lived in cities in 1995). This brings with it many cultural changes, the loss of traditional existence, the marginalization of indigenous groups, and the problems associated with rapid urbanization and industrialization—pollution, increased crime rates, dramatic inequalities, and a location for a hotbed of social and political instability and upheaval.

Developing countries often find that globalization means that both domestic and international capital is directed at the fast-growing and capital-generating industrial sectors in cities and away from regions where other economic activities are taking place. Mexico in the early 1990s saw rapid economic growth in the north of the country (especially in big cities and near the U.S.–Mexico border) due to a large infusion of capital and the development of *maquiladoras*. But this came at the expense of the more agricultural southern regions, which saw little investment, neglect, and increased economic hardship. Indeed, a recent UN report noted that while the level of development in the northern part of Mexico is akin to that of the Czech Republic, Brunei, and Hungary, development in the southern states such as Chiapas and Oaxaca is worse than Samoa and

---

<sup>15</sup> Joseph Kahn, "Workers Face Uphill Battle on Road to Globalization," *International Herald Tribune* (January 24, 2004).

the Dominican Republic. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that the southern territory of Chiapas was the breeding ground for the Zapatista rebellion that began on January 1, 1994—the very day the North American Free-Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, went into effect! Widening regional economic inequality as a result of economic liberalization, globalization, and foreign direct investment directly led to alienation, massive unrest, and political and social instability.

Globalization has gendered effects as well. On the whole, women have been harmed more than men by globalization. Structural adjustment programs often force countries in the developing world to streamline the economy and redirect spending away from social welfare and toward export sectors and other profit-yielding enterprises. This can lead to a reduction in or elimination of many social welfare programs such as health, food, and housing subsidies. Women on average are poorer than men and, as such, are the majority of those dependent on social welfare programs. Therefore, elimination or reduction in these programs affects them disproportionately to men. In addition, women tend to be those in the family responsible for caregiving for children and the elderly. They therefore suffer more directly when such programs are scaled back. For example, Iran's efforts since the early 1990s to take advantage of globalization by liberalizing its economy have put increasing economic pressure on women in Iran. Health and education costs skyrocketed, subsidies for shelter and food were almost entirely eliminated, and working conditions worsened, especially for women in textile and carpet-producing sectors.<sup>16</sup>

An increasingly open trading system also exposes local markets to global competition. Foreign subsidized agriculture or foreign imports undermine women's

---

<sup>16</sup> Simin Royanian, "Women and Globalization, Iran as a Case Study" (2003), [www.women4peace.org/women\\_globalization.html](http://www.women4peace.org/women_globalization.html).

traditional livelihoods as subsistence farmers or small producers in many developing countries. Put out of work by global competition, many women then face cultural barriers when looking for alternative occupations. While women in Iran tend to work in factories and in the service sector as office workers, teachers, and nurses, social constraints may limit those areas that might provide more economic opportunity. Women have less geographic, social, and economic mobility on average than do men, making it harder for them to create new alternatives for themselves and their families.

When women do gain some mobility, they often migrate to urban areas to work in factories, engaging in low-skilled work for little pay. Women make up a large percentage of workers operating in sweatshops, such as in export-processing zones in northern Mexico or China. Many argue that conditions are not likely to get better in these factories as countries compete to attract FDI with the lure of less strict labor regulations and lower wages.<sup>17</sup> Advocates of this view argue that globalization accelerates the **race to the bottom**, a dynamic whereby companies seek the lowest level of regulation and taxation, forcing competing governments to lower their standards of labor, human rights, and environmental protection, taxation, and other regulation.

Yet for many of the poorest, least-developed countries, the problem is not that they are being impoverished by globalization, but that they are in danger of being largely excluded from it. It is nearly impossible to catch up with rapidly growing developing economies, let alone benefit in any way from a globalized, information-based economy if one cannot access education or capital, let alone a phone line, a computer, or the Internet.

---

<sup>17</sup> The irony is that Mexico is currently losing foreign direct investment to China because China's workers make less money to produce the same product. Because globalization has led to a reduced cost of shipping goods, China, halfway around the world, becomes a more attractive location of United States corporations than does neighboring Mexico.

There are fewer telephone lines in all of sub-Saharan Africa than there are in Manhattan. By the late 1990s, the fifth of the world's population living in the highest-income countries had 74 percent of the world's telephone lines, while those residing in the bottom fifth had just 1.5 percent of world telephone lines. In 2000, only 5 percent of people in developing countries subscribed to cell phones, as compared to 46 percent of people in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Of course, that is still better than the 0.3 percent of people in the least-developed countries with cell phones.<sup>18</sup> Ironically, even when globalization does bring significant benefits to economically developing populations, the increased access to technology and information also makes those same people more aware of both global and domestic inequalities.

### **Globalization and the Environment**

Globalization also has negative environmental consequences. For example, industrialization leads to more emissions, contributing to global warming and a deterioration of air and water quality. In addition, profitable resource-based industries such as oil drilling, forestry, mining, and fisheries exploit resources of countries with little regard to the environmental cost.

The major cause of environmental damage is market failure. Market failure occurs when those who are producing or consuming goods or services do not have to bear the full costs of their actions, such as the cost of pollution. This is a particular problem for developing countries. Multinational corporations investing in these countries have no

---

<sup>18</sup> United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report 2002* (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2002).

incentive to be environmentally careful. The host country will eventually bear the cost of problems in the environment, but not the multinational, which is mobile. Moreover, it is difficult for a developing country such as Nigeria to impose environmental conditions on MNCs such as Shell Oil who wish to invest, as they might choose to leave the host country for another locale less concerned about environmental regulation. As a result, the competition for FDI reduces the incentive for host countries to hold polluters accountable, and the mobility of MNCs means they have little incentive not to pollute as they will bear no real cost. This is another illustration of how globalization and the resulting competition for FDI can lead to a "race to the bottom." In Nigeria's case, Shell's actions led to the near destruction of the environment in the Ogoni territory, protests by the Ogoni people, and eventually government collusion with Shell to silence Ogoni opposition. As such, globalization can have unintended economic, political, and social consequences for host countries and MNCs as well as for the environment itself.

### **Global Governance and Regional Integration**

There are some issues that one country, or even one group of countries, cannot solve on its own. Single countries have a serious disincentive to attempt to solve problems of a global scale unilaterally, as others may choose not to help out, and to "free ride" on those efforts. Yet ad-hoc cooperation between a handful of countries on a major issue is hard to maintain. Solving transboundary environmental issues such as the ozone layer and global warming requires extensive global coordination and cooperation. Similarly, the complexity of regulating the global economy requires a global organization.

No one country, not even the United States, can coordinate so many complex issues and solve so many transboundary issues on its own. Recognizing this as early as the end of

World War II, the United States and its allies set up the global institutional infrastructure to allow for global governance. The UN and its family of global institutions created the backbone of that infrastructure. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the World Bank, or International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); and eventually the World Trade Organization (WTO) were set up to regulate the increasingly globalized economy. The World Health Organization (WHO) deals with disease, increasingly a transboundary issue. Indeed, for every major issue that is global in scope, you are likely to find many international organizations whose mission it is to deal with that issue and its transboundary consequences.


Even at the regional level, groups of states have found that working together through shared institutions above the level of the nation-state can lead to more efficient efforts to deal with transboundary issues. Moreover, some countries have found that cooperation through institutions leads to more efficient economic transactions as well. Members of the European Union (then the European Economic Community) found that cooperation on even small technical issues could lead to future cooperation on more important economic or political issues. In a generation's time, old enemies such as Germany and France found themselves cooperating so often and on so many issues in common that they had become highly interdependent and had improved political ties as well. As other countries have joined, they too have benefited from the joint efforts of their neighbors, economically and politically.

However, being a member of an international organization, or even a regional organization, requires countries to give up some of their **sovereignty** over key issues. For example, because of a ruling by the European Court of Justice in the mid-1990s, Britain cannot exclude homosexual citizens from military service. Britain must be willing to

subsume its policy preference to that of the regional organization if it wants to reap the benefits of that association. Similarly, China must now abide by WTO rulings if it wants to reap the benefits of membership in the long run, even if that means hurting economic competitiveness in the short run. Nigeria is obliged to send troops and to lead peacekeeping missions for ECOMOG, the military arm of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), when that regional organization decides to intervene in West African security issues.

While the costs regarding sovereignty and increased sensitivity and vulnerability to other countries' policy choices is clear, the benefits are clear as well. Economic integration has led to overall economic growth in almost every region of the world. As a result, more countries than ever before are willing to cede sovereignty on some issues to gain the overall benefits of integration. As Figure 4 demonstrates, the number of regional trade agreements has skyrocketed in just 10 years, from 43 in 1992 to 181 in 2002.

Figure 4. Number of Regional Trade Agreements, 1948–2002  
(Source: World Trade Organization)



### The Spread of Democracy

The exchanges of goods and money and services that characterize globalization also yield exchanges of information and of ideas. Globalization is driven by economic forces but has numerous political and social consequences. As areas of the world have easier access to other cultures through increased direct contact or indirectly through an increasingly globalized media, ideas spread more easily. In some cases, these ideas take on political form, such as in the spread of democracy, or the idea of individual-centered human rights. These can sometimes lead countries to create institutions or adopt practices that appear to be associated with development, but whose groundwork has not been properly laid. As Nigeria has discovered multiple times in its relatively short history, and as Russia has been learning since the end of the Cold War, one cannot simply adopt a particular democratic institutional model and expect it to succeed. The evolution of



successful democratic institutions is often a matter of decades (as recent developments in Mexico suggest) or even centuries (as epitomized by Great Britain); it requires the presence of a civil society willing to challenge the regime and other members of society; it requires that all sides see politics as not necessarily winner-take-all; it requires respect for the rule of law; and it is aided by economic and political stability and relative peace.

### **Cultural Consequences**

Globalization often has cultural consequences. An omnipresent Western media and Western technological superiority and the spread of ideas through economic interactions facilitate the diffusion of Western culture. World trade in goods with cultural content tripled between 1980 and 1991, from \$67 billion to \$200 billion. At the core of the entertainment industry—film, music, and television—there is a growing dominance of United States products. And the rules of the game in an increasingly globalized economy do not allow local cultures to limit such cultural influences. World Trade Organization rules do not allow countries to block imports on cultural grounds.

Yet some evidence suggests that the new global media is not the vehicle of cultural imperialism that many have argued. As Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate, English language and Western cultural dominance of the Internet is rapidly diminishing. And paradoxically, the new global media have proven a powerful means of projecting traditional culture and values, as well as the ideas of radical opponents of globalization. It is also a medium through which cultural practices and ideas otherwise unknown outside a local area are also transmitted globally. Hollywood has international appeal, but so too does Bollywood (the popular and prolific Indian film industry). Indeed, some have argued that the increased interactions that result from globalization will prompt a defense of local or traditional

cultures, or an increasing heterogeneity of ideas feeding into an emerging global culture. Even when this does not occur, local cultures may practice or interpret global ideas, norms, and practices in different ways.



(Source: [www.global-reach.biz/globstats](http://www.global-reach.biz/globstats))

## **The Decreased Power of States and the Emerging Power of Nonstate Actors**

Revisiting the role of multinationals may help to illustrate how globalization can also weaken the ability of countries to control both what crosses their borders and what goes on inside them. Royal Dutch Shell may be a British and Dutch-owned corporation, but the governments of the Netherlands and Great Britain (Shell's **home countries**) have little direct influence over Shell's actions in Nigeria. Moreover, because of the need to stay competitive and attract foreign capital, jobs, and technology, it is difficult for a developing **host country** like Nigeria to affect Shell's actions or policies, even within its own borders. Corporations like Shell are all but unaccountable for their actions, even when these actions generate conflict, poverty, and corruption within host countries.<sup>19</sup>

Governments also have a harder time controlling the flow of information and ideas in a more globalized world. It is harder to hide human rights abuses when survivors can go online to share stories, or when CNN cameras let us witness the aftermath of demonstrations or riots, or when satellites pick up the existence of mass graves. The state has some tools at its disposal to cope with such challenges to authority. China, for example, has gone to great lengths to restrict the flow of information and access to technology in an effort to maintain control. Censoring prodemocracy Internet sites is one such strategy for maintaining control.<sup>20</sup>

Yet these efforts often prove difficult to implement successfully, especially when the spread of technology provides individuals and groups with multiple options for accessing or spreading ideas and information. Protesters against international economic

---

<sup>19</sup> "Shell Admits Fuelling Corruption," *BBC News* (June 11, 2004).

<sup>20</sup> Howard W. French, "Despite an Act of Leniency, China Has Its Eye on the Web," *The New York Times* (June 27, 2004).

organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO have routinely coordinated demonstrations via email and mobile phones, allowing them to stay one step ahead of police. When, in the former Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis and the bombing of Belgrade in 1999, Slobodan Milosevic denied radio stations access to local airwaves, dissident broadcasters took to the Internet and reached a wider (and more global) audience than before. In Iran, the Internet has become an important alternative method of communication within civil society. As the judiciary bans newspapers and magazines, several proreform publications have turned to the Internet to get their message across. Weblogs, or "blogs," have become an outlet for free expression among members of a civil society forced underground and online. As one prominent e-dissident suggests, such outlets "are a decentralized network of free information—that's why the officials do not like them very much."<sup>21</sup> In 2003, when the Iranian government attempted to censor online content, Internet users accessed another strand of the globalization web, appealing not to forces within their country, but to the United Nations, via email protests and Weblog postings to a Web site devoted to the UN's digital summit in Geneva.

Countries also have less control than ever before over the flow of people, communicable diseases, pollution, drugs, arms, hazardous materials, and even terrorist activity. Terrorists such as Al Qaeda are stateless and have acquired the knowledge, resources, and support to employ destructive capability using the same technology through which you or I might place a phone call home or check stock prices. Terrorists, arms dealers, and drug cartels all operate as underground cross-border networks, moving money, people, or contraband across borders with greater ease than ever before.

---

<sup>21</sup> Aaron Scullion, "Iranian Bloggers Rally Against Censorship," BBC News Online (December 11, 2003), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3310493.stm>.

State efforts to counter such threats often lead them to difficult tradeoffs between security and civil liberties, even in the most democratic of states. In fact, such networks have an easier time exploiting liberal democracies because of the nature of open societies. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that liberal democracies such as India, Great Britain, Israel, or Spain are the most frequent targets of suicide bombings.<sup>22</sup> Rather than leading to the often-reported decline of the state, such threats tend to lead some states to reassert their sovereignty. They may lock down borders, tighten security, escalate police patrols and surveillance, and increase intelligence gathering.

On the other hand, countries that host the hubs of these networks (such as Afghanistan under the Taliban) often find themselves hostage to such activity. Iran's involvement with organizations that engage in terrorist activities such as Hezbollah has often led to political and economic sanctions. Russia has reduced the influence of organized crime in recent years but has been unable to eliminate it. Mexico's experiences mixing PRI politics with drug cartels ate away at the ruling party's legitimacy both at home and abroad. Similar problems arise regarding the use of illegal networks to facilitate the flow of drugs, hazardous materials, and illegal arms across borders.

States are also faced with dilemmas regarding how to deal with the increasing mobility of people. Globalization often leads countries to open their borders to flows of people across borders. For example, with European Union (EU) citizenship comes the ability to travel and work anywhere in the EU. But the EU must also find a way to balance that freedom of movement with the need for security and the ability to prosecute

---

<sup>22</sup> Robert Pape "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (2003): 1–19.

international crime and terrorism. For developing countries, the reduced cost of movement across borders to access jobs or education can be a boon, but it can also lead to a “brain drain,” as the best minds and most educated leave their country for greater opportunities or rewards elsewhere. This forces countries to consider how to keep borders open to the flow of ideas, information, and monetary capital while also retaining **human capital**.

Developed and developing countries are often affected differently by the same challenges presented by the increased mobility of people and labor across borders. For example, Britain has actively recruited nurses from abroad, primarily from the Philippines, in the last few years to help alleviate the nurse shortage in the National Health Service that resulted from budget cutbacks and a shrinking welfare state. According to one article, “in the last three years alone, more than 30,000 foreign nurses have been enticed to Britain.”<sup>23</sup> These nurses will work for significantly less money than will British-trained nurses, benefiting the migrants and the UK health system. But the result for the Philippines is that hospitals are closing and operations are being cancelled because of a severe nursing shortage.

There is also great pressure on developed countries, as a result of the economic competition associated with open markets, to restrict migration (one of the first targets of an antiglobalization public policy backlash).<sup>24</sup> Moreover, when under pressure economically, culturally, or politically, governments and populations both tend to react with suspicion to those culturally different from them. For instance, the globalization of terrorism and informal violence in the form of the recent wave of Islamic fundamentalist

---

<sup>23</sup> Mark Rice-Oxley, “Britain Looks Abroad for Nurses,” *Christian Science Monitor* (July 29, 2003).

<sup>24</sup> Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, “The Future of Globalization,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 37, no. 3 (2002): 248.

violence against the U.S., Britain, Israel, Spain, and other Western democratic states has led to a crackdown by these states on migration and a tightening on borders for security reasons. Moreover, increased policing and other internal security measures make life for culturally distinct groups more difficult.

The changes in wealth accumulation and widening inequalities within countries, the easier movement of people across borders, the weakening of state sovereignty, and the evolution of international and transnational organizations have combined to aid in the development of multiple layers of loyalties and identities to which individuals may ascribe. A Pakistani-born British bank teller in London may identify as a union member, a member of the working class, a Londoner, English, British, a member of the European Union, Pakistani, an immigrant, nonwhite, Muslim, or even simply a member of the global community, among other allegiances. Similarly, a Nigerian in Lagos might consider herself as an office worker, a woman, a Christian, a Yoruba, a citizen of her particular state, a Nigerian, an African, a member of the world community, or any number of other things.

Globalization can lead to state **disintegration** and often to violence, ethnic conflict, civil war, or secessionism. Examples abound, from the influence of terror networks on the secessionist war in Chechnya to the uprising in Chiapas in 1994, sparked in part by the signing of the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Yet nonviolent means are available to deal with these pressures. Some states find devolution of power to local or regional political units, as in Britain's attempts in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, to be useful ways of both coping with these pressures for autonomy and uniqueness and maintaining some measure of central control and national unity. Some states concentrate their efforts on creating and maintaining a federal structure of government to deal with these pressures, as in Mexico, Russia, and Nigeria. **Decentralization** of political power

can enable representation of ethnic, religious, linguistic, and indigenous groups in a way not previously possible.

Paradoxically, globalization can lead to both the breakdown in national sovereignty and identity as well as a resurgence of nationalism. Nigeria has reacted to exploitation by MNCs by increasing efforts to “Nigerianize” the oil industry. Russian nationalism has been a rallying point for the Putin government in its efforts to deal with Chechnya, as well as in its efforts to move away from the decentralized governmental structure of Russia’s federal system and to recentralize power in the office of the president. The ruling clerics in Iran rely on calls to both nationalism and religious identity in attempts to mobilize hard-line supporters. Conversely, the reform-minded clerics also use nationalism as a rallying point. British nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment fluctuates, usually rising in times of economic distress or security risk.

But the forces of fragmentation are less likely to devastate states with a long history and tradition of statehood than they are to wreak havoc in states that are relatively new constructs. Countries with strong states and less-fragmented populations are able to resist the fragmentary pull of globalization better than can weak states with dramatic social cleavages.<sup>25</sup> This may explain why by most measures (economic growth, political stability, social fragmentation) Iran has fared better in an increasingly globalized world than has Nigeria, and China resisted fragmentation more easily than did the former Soviet Union.

---

<sup>25</sup> Daniel Drezner, “Globalizers of the World Unite!” *The Washington Quarterly* 21, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 209–226.

## **An Evolving Global Citizenship**

States, international organizations, and multinational corporations are not the only actors that have had to react to the challenges presented by globalization. Citizen groups now closely scrutinize labor and environmental records of multinationals. Recent experience of the apparel industry indicates that bad publicity can impose significant costs on these firms and even change their behavior. Human rights groups are widely credited with bringing some of the worst aftereffects of globalization to our attention. Groups of concerned people have created worldwide networks of information and activists and have in the process become more effective. Moreover, the globalization of media has aided public awareness and facilitated a sense of connectedness—of global citizenship. Ironically, globalization has provided the means through which individuals can find common causes across geographic boundaries and mobilize, often in reaction to these very processes of globalization themselves!

There is no better evidence of this emerging global citizenship and its reaction to globalization itself than in the antiglobalization protests of the last few years. Mass protests against the World Trade Organization, the IMF, and the World Bank were rapidly organized and coordinated across borders. These protests were aimed at changing not only national policies, but also the policies of international governmental organizations. As such, they capitalized on the web or network of interconnections that extended across geographic boundaries and also around national channels that normally address individual and group concerns.

Just as remarkable were the global protests against the 2003 United States–Iraq war. Almost 10 million protesters in 600 cities around the world engaged in almost simultaneous mass protests on February 15, 2003. Even more remarkable was that more

than 5 million protesters in 60 countries were organized in only 90 days! The expanding global communications network and some common concern allowed for the creation of a “self-organizing” mass political movement in which a loose global plan could be implemented in diverse ways through the initiative of local organizations.<sup>26</sup> These events merely made obvious the extent and potential of transnational advocacy networks, which had been developing since the globalization of the women’s rights movement and the global movement for civil and human rights.<sup>27</sup> With increasing globalization comes a greater ability by transnational groups to “recruit, raise funds, and operate internationally faster and farther than ever before.”<sup>28</sup> The result has been the emergence of global mass politics as a new form of interest articulation.

The global “scaling up” of violence by individuals and substate actors is the unfortunate flip side of this kind of interest articulation and global “citizenship.” Using the same methods of coordination and mobilization through transnational networks, and taking advantage of the same technological advances, these global citizens wield their tools as deadly weapons. Just as we see at the national level, at the global level unconventional politics come in many varieties, some nonviolent and some violent. Regardless of the form that interest articulation takes, now more than ever before individuals feel that they can and should affect decisions on a global level. And for better or for worse, they do, but only via unconventional participation.

---

<sup>26</sup> Jeffrey Sachs, “The Globalization of Mass Politics,” *Project Syndicate* (February 2003), [www.project-syndicate.org/commentaries/commentary\\_text.php4?id=1118&lang=1&m=contributor](http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentaries/commentary_text.php4?id=1118&lang=1&m=contributor).

<sup>27</sup> Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998).

<sup>28</sup> Moises Naim, “An Indigenous World: How Native Peoples Can Turn Globalization to Their Advantage,” *Foreign Policy* (November/December 2003): 97.

One of the main criticisms of the institutions of global governance is what some call the “democratic deficit,” the idea that international institutions of governance represent elites and governments rather than individuals or groups, and are thus not able to be held accountable for their actions. Rarely is an individual able to elect (or vote out) representatives to a supranational body (a rare exception being representatives to the European Parliament). Thus, unlike politics at the national level in a democratic system of governance, there are few if any avenues through which global citizens may articulate their interests via conventional politics.

One key vehicle through which global citizens can act is the **international non-governmental organization** (INGO). In 1956, there were 973 INGOs in the world. By 1996, that number jumped to almost 5,500. Organizations such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Doctors Without Borders, and the International Red Cross/Red Crescent/Star of David are able to give aid or gather and disseminate sensitive information, or provide services that countries might be unwilling or unable to do on their own. Often they serve as watchdogs, constraining the ability of other actors to act with impunity. Transnational Corporation Watch publicizes poor labor practices of MNCs such as Nike in an attempt to hold them accountable and change their policies. Amnesty International reports on police brutality and torture on the U.S.–Mexico border, repression in Tibet and Xinjiang Province in China, and the restrictions on women in Iran. Doctors Without Borders publicizes ethnic cleansing in the Darfur region of the Sudan and human rights abuses by the Russian military in Chechnya.

## **Coping with Globalization**

Despite the forces tearing at the fabric of the state and complicating the policymaking environment in which countries exists, the sovereign state as we know it is far from obsolete, and the forces of globalization are far from all-powerful or unstoppable. For example, “concerted action by governments, central banks, financial market authorities, banks and major companies prevented a disastrous panic in the aftermath of 11 September [2001].”<sup>29</sup> National governments make policy choices that take advantage of or react to globalization. And countries, not market forces, create supranational organizations and other mechanisms for governing the forces of globalization. Still, the environment in which states operate is ever more complex, the actors they must contend with are ever more diverse, and the consequences of their actions have ever more global implications.

---

<sup>29</sup> Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, “The Future of Globalization,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 37, no. 3 (2002): 253.

## Summary—Costs and Benefits of Globalization

### Costs of Globalization

- Erosion of state sovereignty
- Increased pressures from outside of state boundaries to conform to global norms
- Increased pressures from within state boundaries for autonomy, secession
- Increasing vulnerability to choices or actions of other actors
- Need to increase sensitivity to events, choices, actions that occur outside one's control
- Problems that were once containable within national borders (crime, drugs, disease, economic crises, terrorism) spread across borders more easily and more rapidly.
- Labor and capital in poorer countries are more easily exploited—they often see an increase in economic growth, but not economic development, and do not benefit nearly as much as developed countries or home countries of MNCs.
- Increased pressure to compete globally
- Costs of rapid urbanization, industrialization (pollution, crime, inequalities, instability)
- Gendered effects: gender inequality in benefits, access, mobility, power
- “Americanization” and the possible cultural and political backlash: threats to national or traditional cultures, emphasis on homogenization

## **Benefits of Globalization**

- Interdependence leads to more interactions, more need to cooperate.
- Reduction in barriers to trade, investment, and the movement of physical and human capital makes economic transactions easier, more efficient, more profitable.
- Rapid economic growth
- Consumers gain access to a "global" array of products and at cheaper prices
- Ability to more easily access information, innovation, technology, capital
- Development of regional and global institutions to cope with regional or global problems
- Spread of democracy and human rights
- Increased ability to organize or spread one's political message across borders
- Empowerment of actors other than states
- New avenues for political access, redress of grievances, voice
- An evolving sense of global citizenship

## Glossary of Key Words

**decentralization.** Dispersing power among multiple political actors or levels of government in order to reduce the amount of concentration of power in one authority (usually the central government).

**disintegration.** Fragmentation as a result of the dissolving of bonds or interconnections that otherwise tie together multiple political actors or units.

**foreign direct investment (FDI).** Investment of financial resources into one country by a multinational corporation (or other investor) located in another country for the purpose of creating new businesses or purchasing existing ones.

**home country.** The country in which a multinational corporation is headquartered. For example, while Nike has factories all around the world, it is originally a United States corporation and is headquartered in the United States. The United States is Nike's "home" country.

**host country.** The country in which a multinational corporation invests or operates outside the borders of its home country. For example, if Nike, a United States multinational corporation, sets up factories or distribution centers in Malaysia, Malaysia serves as the "host" country for Nike.

**human capital.** Skills, knowledge, and education that individuals can “invest” in any endeavor.

**integration.** The creation or existence of bonds or interconnections to tie together multiple political actors or units.

**interdependence.** A relationship between two or more actors characterized by mutual dependence. Each actor is affected by the actions and decisions of the others because each actor is tied to the others through extensive political, economic, or social commitments.

**multinational corporation (MNC).** A firm (business enterprise) that has active business operations physically located in more than one country. The firm must do more than simply trade or invest abroad. It must actively produce goods or services, have a branch office, or otherwise directly interact within markets of other countries.

**non-governmental organizations (NGOs).** Organized political actors other than governments; these can range from terrorist organizations to human rights monitoring organizations to environmental groups to multinational corporations or unions. NGOs can operate within the domestic political sphere or in the international political environment (the latter are often referred to as **INGOs—International Non-Governmental Organizations**).

**race to the bottom.** A dynamic downward spiral in areas of state oversight regarding the welfare of the state in which the tendency of firms to seek the lowest level of restrictions on their operations leads to the tendency by governments to reduce regulations on corporations in order to attract their investment.

**sensitivity.** The degree to which one actor is responsive to changes of decisions or behavior by another actor as a result of the actors being interconnected.

**sovereignty.** The right to rule or to exercise power over one's affairs. Countries claim to be sovereign over what goes on within their own borders, and thus they alone may make rules or decisions regarding domestic policies or actions. One may choose to give up some measure of sovereignty and allow another to have some say in how one is governed.

**vulnerability.** The degree to which one actor is adversely affected by changes of decisions or behavior by another actor as a result of the actors being interconnected.

## **Annotated Bibliography of Useful Books on Globalization**

**Barber, Benjamin J. *Jihad vs. McWorld: How the Planet Is Both Falling Apart and Coming Together and What This Means for Democracy*. New York: Times Books, 1995.**

Barber's influential book sees globalization as creating two diametrically opposed forces—Jihad (global disintegration or fragmentation) and McWorld (global integration or homogenization). He argues that these forces operate with equal strength in opposite directions, pulling at the nation-state and making democratic governance difficult, if not impossible.

**Bhagwati, Jagdish. *In Defense of Globalization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.**

A noted economist and former adviser to the UN on globalization, Jagdish Bhagwati explains why the arguments of the critics of globalization are problematic. He argues that globalization actually alleviates many of the problems for which it has been blamed.

Written for the lay reader with the intent of reaching a broad audience.

**Friedman, Thomas L. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000.**

Friedman, one of globalization's most widely read advocates, argues that globalization is the international system that replaced the Cold War system. Friedman dramatizes the tension between globalization and forces of culture, geography, tradition, and community. He also details the powerful backlash that globalization produces. This accessible book by

the Pulitzer Prize–winning *New York Times* columnist helped to popularize the concept of globalization.

**Huntington, Samuel P. *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998.**

Huntington's controversial argument, given new life after September 11, 2001, is that political conflict in the era of globalization is likely to be culturally based rather than ideologically or economically based. He argues that conflict will occur on the fault lines between clusters of countries or peoples, loosely grouped into "civilizations."

**Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. *Activists Beyond Borders*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.**

Keck and Sikkink discuss the evolution of transnational social movements and how these new global citizens (what they call the "cosmopolitan community of individuals") operate. They discuss the rise of global activists and the development of tactics that transcend national borders. The book uses historical examples of how international networks of political activists have affected issues of human rights abuses by states (especially in Latin America), slavery, environmental politics, suffrage, and violence against women. This accessible academic work helps us rethink how international civil society develops, and how international politics is practiced by international non-governmental actors in an era of globalization.

**Nye, Joseph S., Jr., and John D. Donahue, eds. *Governance in a Globalizing World: Visions of Governance in the 21st Century*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000.**

This book asks how patterns of globalization are currently evolving, how these patterns affect governance, and how globalization might be governed. The authors map the trajectory of globalization and examine the impact of globalization on governance within individual countries (including China, struggling countries in the developing world, and industrialized democracies). The authors also discuss efforts to improvise new approaches to governance, including the role of non-governmental institutions, the global dimensions of information policy, and speculation on global economic governance.

**O'Meara, Patrick, Howard D. Mehlinger, and Matthew Krain, eds. *Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century: A Reader*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000.**

A collection of major articles and position papers on globalization. By bringing together a number of major thinkers and different perspectives, this book provides a broad introduction to the topic and lays the groundwork for an interdisciplinary collaborative dialogue. Meant for students, it is organized by topic (including conflict and security, democracy, economic integration, and culture). The book also has a resource bibliography and a brief guide to globalization resources on the Web.

**Spero, Joan E., and Jeffrey A. Hart. *The Politics of International Economic Relations*. 6th ed. New York: Thomson Wadsworth, 2003.**

An excellent core textbook for any class on international political economy. The sixth edition places a much greater emphasis on economic globalization. The book covers topics in an in-depth manner and is certainly an advanced text, but it is rather accessible.

**Stiglitz, Joseph E. *Globalization and Its Discontents*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2003.**

Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize-winning economist, discusses (in highly accessible prose) how economic globalization has affected poorer nations and what reforms are needed to ensure that these countries also reap the benefits of globalization. Stiglitz chronicles his time as economic advisor to the Clinton administration and as the former chief economist of the World Bank during the height of the global boom (and bust) of the 1990s. He discusses in detail the handling of the East Asian Economic Crisis, the Mexican Peso Crisis and bailout, IMF structural adjustment policies, political and economic transitions in East Europe and Russia, and the debate over free trade policies. He is highly critical of the management of globalization by the West in general and by the IMF in particular.

## **Annotated Bibliography of Useful Web Sites About Globalization**

Corporate Watch

[www.corpwatch.org/globalization](http://www.corpwatch.org/globalization)

Online resource center about corporate activity and globalization.

Emory University (Sociology) Globalization

[www.emory.edu/SOC/globalization](http://www.emory.edu/SOC/globalization)

A broad range of usefully organized information on globalization.

Global Policy Forum Globalization Web Page

[www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz](http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz)

Web site that offers globalization-related policy descriptions and debates.

The Globalist

[www.theglobalist.com](http://www.theglobalist.com)

Site “for global citizens, by global citizens,” with information and articles about globalization.

Globalization—About.Com

<http://globalization.about.com>

Site that offers information on globalization in the news as well as public views of globalization.

### International Forum on Globalization

[www.ifg.org](http://www.ifg.org)

Home page of an alliance of activists, scholars, and writers formed to stimulate public education in response to the rapidly emerging global economic and political arrangement.

### Multinational Monitor

[www.essential.org/monitor/monitor.html](http://www.essential.org/monitor/monitor.html)

Another online resource center about corporate activity and globalization.

### World Bank—Globalization

[www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/globalization](http://www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/globalization)

Web page devoted to explaining globalization and policy reactions to it by one of the key international organizations that participates in global governance.

### WTO Watch

[www.wtowatch.org](http://www.wtowatch.org)

Constantly updated news on antiglobalization perspectives, as well as a resource center and watchdog of the World Trade Organization.

